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Informed and robust stakeholder participation in the transit-planning process gives 
residents and communities a remarkable opportunity to take ownership of the shaping of their 
city’s future form and function, and allows planners to design transit networks that serve the full 
range of citizen needs. Therefore, the degree to which citizens are permitted to participate in the 
formation of a city’s transit plan has a significant influence on both its final design and its 
subsequent adoption by civic and political leaders. Concurrent with the influence of citizen input 
is the role of political strategy, since many urban transit plans must meet voter approval and a 
poorly-run political campaign can sink even the most substantial of transit plans. In seeking to 
analyze both the role of public participation and the role of campaign strategy, this study 
employs descriptive historical research and stakeholder surveys to assess the impact and 
perceived importance of inclusive design practices, as well as the political impact of a transit 
campaign’s general strategy, on the voter approval of transit-related ballot initiatives in Kansas 
City, Missouri. There are two central implications of this project. One is that the failure of 
transportation planners and civic activists in Kansas City to accommodate the wishes and input 
of diverse groups of residents and community leaders in the planning process has led to repeated 
defeats whenever said plans are presented to Kansas City voters for approval. The other is that 
urban politics and campaign strategies play a larger role in selling transit proposals than many 
leading figures in Kansas City have realized, and that the city’s unique political and geographic 
structure requires a more nuanced and technologically-diverse approach to voter persuasion than 
has been applied thus far. It can be theorized that reversing both of these trends will increase the 
likelihood of future voter approval of transportation initiatives. In addition to a political and 
historical analysis of transit in Kansas City, this study seeks to examine whether deliberate 
public participation in the transportation planning process has a direct impact on citizen support 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
“Visionaries are most successful when they find community consensus.” 
      –Warren Erdman, rail executive and Kansas City transit advocate 
Within the national discussion of transportation planning and urban policy, the question 
of designing efficient, equitable, and well-used public transit networks remains an issue of 
growing interest. While public transit nothing new to cities, the postmodernist approach of 
involving citizens and community stakeholders in the transit-planning process is a relatively new 
phenomenon. Still, given the high costs of urban mass transit, a system’s dependence on frequent 
riders, and the ways in which transit systems are funded with taxpayer dollars, robust community 
buy-in is essential to a system’s political survival and ultimate success. Political feasibility is 
particularly important in North American cities, as most transit initiatives there must seek voter 
approval in order to fund and construct systems. If transit in North America depends in large part 
on political capital, and on the sustained approval of voters and taxpayers, then the ways in 
which transportation planners engage citizens in the planning process is key. Furthermore, if 
citizens have ample opportunities, both formal and informal, to participate in the planning and 
design of transit systems in their cities and to obtain “ownership” of the proposals, then it 
logically follows that those same citizens would be more likely to support transit initiatives when 
they came up for a public vote. This project aims to examine the relationship between citizen 
engagement and subsequent voting attitudes regarding transit initiatives and referenda in Kansas 
City, Missouri. That city’s lengthy track record of mass-transit initiatives that have failed to gain 
voter approval or political traction makes it an ideal location for examining the correlation 
between citizen input and the making and marketing of plans that voters accept.  
  This project seeks to be a major contribution to the understanding of the ways in which 
citizens, as stakeholders, can and should play a role in the transportation planning process. As the 
planning profession grows more inclusive of citizen input in the conceptual stages of plan-
making, those working in the field will have a greater demand for evidence on whether seeking 
said input will lead to more effective planning down the line. This study is an attempt to meet 
some of that demand, and to better understand the role and benefits of inclusion in the planning 
process. The data gathered by this study will advance the notion that transportation plans that 
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earnestly incorporate the desires of the populations they serve tend to have a better chance of 
being approved by voters and accepted by passengers and political officials.  
Background 
The story of mass transit in Kansas City is as much about geography as it is about urban 
history. As a prototypical American city, Kansas City features a dense downtown, several aging 
inner-ring suburbs once serviced by streetcar lines, and a growing outer belt of suburban 
developments. But unlike many other American cities, Kansas City features a single-mode transit 
network that has struggled with both ridership figures and regional connectivity. The region is 
both vast and well-populated, indicating an optimal site for a multimodal transit network. 
According to federal data, the Kansas City MSA has an area of 7,952 square miles, and is home 
to over 2.3 million people (ACS 2009 Population Estimate). The Kansas City area also hosts 
more lane-miles of freeway than any other American city (Spivak, 2007). Given the region’s vast 
geographic size and easy access to highways, it can be plainly seen how the automobile is the 
dominant form of transportation in Kansas City. The region is not without mass transit, however, 
with the bi-state Kansas City Area Transportation Authority (KCATA) administering a network 
of over sixty bus and two BRT routes throughout the five core counties of the region.  
While it will not be studied as a part of this research project, the Kansas City Downtown 
Streetcar is a recent transit development that will likely have a political impact on the region’s 
transit reputation (Alonzo, 2013). This new mode of transit, funded by a special-purpose sales 
tax enacted by voters in August of 2012, will initially link the River Market district to Union 
Station. As of this project’s publication, phase one of the streetcar remains under construction, 
and extensions linking downtown to the Country Club Plaza and the Northland are in the 
planning stages. While the construction of a new mode of transit in the study area presents a 
unique opportunity to study citizen-planner interactions, the streetcar’s limited scope (phase one 
is a 2.2-mile starter line) distinguishes it from the region-wide transit proposals of prior years. 
Also, the funding mechanism for the Streetcar, a special-purpose district centered on the initial 
line, is a legally-distinct entity from the City of Kansas City. This would likely prevent the 
Streetcar, or at least its revenue source, from being included in future citywide transit plans 




Statement of Purpose 
 Given Kansas City’s unique transportation situation, as well as the growing desire both 
there and nationally to transition to a transportation network based less on automobiles and more 
on mass transit, a study such as this may be instrumental for helping policymakers in the region 
take proper actions to solve the problem that has plagued the region for decades. As the historical 
research will show, the voters of Kansas City have had ample experience with unworkable and 
unpopular transit initiatives that were backed by controversial activists and were soundly 
defeated at the ballot box. As a new generation of politicians and technocrats takes over the 
administration of the region, projects such as this, with hard data and substantive policy 
recommendations, may help the area’s leaders to take the sort of measured, rational, and 
inclusive actions needed to design and market a next-generation transit network that voters will 
both approve of and support with strong ridership. 
Research Overview 
 As stated previously, the research component of this project will feature both a 
descriptive study of the politics of transit in Kansas City and a survey of voter perceptions 
regarding the same. The mixed-methods approach outlined here will be instrumental in exploring 
the intersection of transit and politics in this American city. 
 Historical and Political Analysis 
The analysis will explore and describe transportation and transit in Kansas City. It will 
provide a historical overview of the city’s public transit systems over the past several decades, as 
well as a detailed study of the nine ballot initiatives and proposals regarding transit that have 
been placed before Kansas City voters in the past twenty years. The purpose of this portion of the 
project is to explain the ways in which Kansas City’s unique geographical, cultural, and political 
environment have contributed to the performance of transit-related ballot questions there. The 
nine initiatives and proposals will be analyzed using two existing methodologies first presented 
by Slotterback (2010) and Haas and Estrada (2011). The findings from this analysis will serve to 
demonstrate the importance of voter perception and political reputation in the process of selling a 
transit plan to the taxpaying public.  
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For the purposes of clarity, this project shall distinguish between a ballot initiative and a 
ballot proposition. According to the Initiative and Referendum Institute at the University of 
Southern California’s School of Law, an initiative is generally a proposal placed on the ballot by 
way of citizen petition, which is permitted by both the Missouri Constitution and the Charter of 
Kansas City. In the case of Kansas City, all petition-driven proposals are reviewed by the City 
Council, and generally appear on a citywide ballot only if the Council does not pursue the matter 
to the petitioners’ satisfaction. On the other hand, a proposition is generally placed on the ballot 
by a legislative body, in this case the City Council of Kansas City, after having been first 
approved by a majority of councilmembers. Of the nine ballot questions examined in this project, 
seven were petition-driven initiatives and two were city-sanctioned propositions. The distinction 
between these two types of ballot questions – activist-supported initiatives versus government-
sponsored propositions – is essential to understanding this project’s findings regarding voter 
perceptions of transit proposals.  
 Stakeholder Survey 
The stakeholder survey was administered to citizens residing in a variety of neighborhood 
and community associations throughout Kansas City, Missouri. It will consist of a handful of 
questions designed to gauge citizen perception of the transit-planning process in Kansas City. 
The survey will also feature an example of Arnstein’s Ladder of Participation (1969), and 
respondents will be asked to indicate which of the eight stages of public input best signifies 
where they believe their existing working relationship with city planners lies. On the whole, 
responses from the survey will contribute much-needed quantifiable evidence that voters do 
indeed value public participation, and the degree to which they might value public input over 




Chapter 2 - Review of Literature 
From a planning and policy perspective, a transit campaign in a political context hinges 
on two factors that often run their course before ballots are even cast: The degree to which the 
public is engaged in the planning and programming of the proposal (Beale et al., 1996), and the 
marketing of the campaign itself (Middleton, 1998). Existing research regarding voter attitudes 
toward transit funding frequently falls into one of these two categories, and both must be 
examined for the role they play in the process. The study of public engagement in the planning 
process was in many ways launched with Arnstein’s seminal work (1969) on the topic, and many 
subsequent studies by other researchers, with similar findings, are explored here. While each 
focuses on a different region, methodology, or public service being offered, all of the public 
engagement studies featured here demonstrate the immense political value in including citizen 
input in the planning process. For the latter portion of this review, the study set focusing on 
campaign strategies is smaller (due partly to a smaller number of easily-generalized findings), 
but the authors have drawn similar conclusions regarding the vital need for a transit campaign to 
follow a tried and true set of strategies in order to succeed. On the whole, research into both 
halves of this topic has tended to be regional in scope and only somewhat generalizable, which is 
expected and preferred considering the unique makeup and history of each human settlement. 
Research into public participation, or P2 for short, in the planning and policymaking 
process has been well documented. Numerous metrics and guidelines exist to assist planners and 
citizens in determining whether their project’s process of gathering and integrating citizen input 
matches the desired level of all parties. Many of the studies exploring and explaining these 
metrics can be found in Table 2.1. In spite of the volume of current research on the topic, 
however, transportation planning in the United States has still not reached a uniform level of 
public participation and stakeholder involvement. In addition to the research being done on the 
subject, numerous state and federal statutes have been in effect since the 1950s to mandate open 
and vigorous citizen participation in the planning process. Yet some cities and states still struggle 
with obtaining and absorbing substantive public input in their plans. The historical analysis 
examined within this project – the process of planning a light-rail network for the Kansas City 
metropolitan area – is one such example of a flawed process that has, year after year, failed to 
make it past the conceptual stage and into the accepting minds of voters and taxpayers. 
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Table 2.1: Comparable Analysis of Selected Studies 




public input online 




6,892 page visits 




flaws in P2. 
Online P2 worked well 
for this task. Internet 
may solve P2-input 
dilemmas 





their effect on the 





To find ways to 
refine state P2 
mandates to gain 
richer input 
Mandates matter, but 
should be recalibrated in 
four uniform changes. 
Slotterback 
(2010) 
Impacts of P2 on 







To seek common 
variables/inputs 
and form a guide 
for proper P2 
Identifies 6 components 







areas in New York 
City 
To illustrate 
power roles in 
decision-making 
Few governments 
granted real authority to 
citizens in 1960s 
Grossardt, et 
al. (2003) 
The realization of 
equitable P2 in 
planning processes 
Three case 
studies using SPI  





the P2 process 
SPI can provide a 
structured framework 





seeks public input 
Case study of a 
Superfund site in 
western Kentucky 
To gather and 
rank public 
preferences 
The public desires 
technical expertise from 
planners 
Bailey, et al. 
(2011) 




Applied SPI to a 
small city’s comp-
planning process 
To use SPI in an 
attempt to close 
the Arnstein Gap 
















“Seven Principles of 
New Public Service” 









To find common 
factors affecting 
voter approval of 
transit finance 
A set of consistent 









To apply the 
Haas metric to 
additional cities 
The prior factors were 
vindicated, and new 













To apply the 
Haas metric a 
decade later to 
cities in a 
different political 
and tax climate 
Ten years later, factors 
still apply to cities; 
Compiled final list of 17 
factors for success 
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To begin to understand how public participation has evolved over time as a matter of 
governmental concern, one must first examine the federal laws that were among the first in North 
America to mandate the participation of citizens in the process of planning public facilities and 
infrastructure. In the first decade following the passage of the National Interstate and Defense 
Highways Act of 1956, massive Interstate highway projects were constructed in both rural and 
urban areas across the U.S., often very near to existing homes and neighborhoods, and virtually 
no public input was sought by the planners of these highways (Connerly, 2002). It would not be 
until the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 that the federal 
government would require projects using federal funds to seek public participation in the 
planning process, particularly in the area of environmental-impact analysis. NEPA would later be 
augmented by the next two federal laws to overhaul surface transportation in the U.S.: The 
Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) of 1991 and the Safe, Accountable, 
Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) of 2005. 
Each of these federal acts called for increased public involvement and spurred the states to pass 
similar mandates for projects receiving state transportation funding (Slotterback, 2010). The 
most recent federal surface-transportation legislation, the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21
st
 
Century Act (MAP-21), advanced no new reforms in public involvement, but retained the 
government’s stated view that the public’s participation should be an integral part of the transit-
planning process. Taken together, these mandates have greatly contributed to the modern-day 
ethos of planners as respondents to public demand, rather than as Promethean technocrats 
bringing the rational science of city-making to urbanites in need. 
While a cursory overview of the federal laws governing public participation in 
transportation projects are a good first step in assessing the literature of public involvement in 
the planning process, such an assessment would be woefully incomplete without discussing the 
publication that effectively began the conversation in the literature. The seminal article on 
measuring the effectiveness of citizen participation – the article that has formed the heart of this 
discourse for over forty years and remains relevant – is Sherry Arnstein’s “Ladder of Public 
Participation” (1969). Arnstein made two key assertions in the paper. The first, that the 
relationship between citizen-activists and governments was one of power-distribution, is less 
useful for this research than her second assertion, the “Ladder of Public Participation” (Figure 
2.1). This simple illustration of Arnstein’s theory of an eight-point spectrum of public 
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participation in the policymaking process set forth a metric that is still being used more than four 
decades after it was published. Contemporary applications of Arnstein’s Ladder are legion, and 
many will be examined over the course of this paper. The Ladder itself will also play a major 
role in the surveys and the analysis of historic participation. 
Figure 2.1: Arnstein’s Ladder of Public Participation 
 
Note: graphic originally created by T. Grossardt, 2003 
  Beginning in 2003, the research team of Grossardt and Bailey applied Arnstein’s Ladder 
to collaborative planning efforts in the post ISTEA/SAFETEA-LU era. The authors observed 
contemporary methods of citizen participation and synthesized a framework of principles around 
which more effective participation could be organized. They called their process Structured 
Public Involvement, or SPI. This protocol calls for, among other things: a clear statement of 
responsibilities and goals by both parties, using mixed methods that allow the public to take 
ownership of both the process and the outcome, and utilizing transparency at all stages. In their 
initial publication, the authors explained that SPI could greatly improve existing negotiation 
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tactics, but cautioned against using a one-size-fits-all approach to engaging the public in the 
planning process. In a subsequent publication, the authors surveyed professionals and members 
of the public during a community-planning exercise in western Kentucky. Upon examining the 
responses, Grossardt and Bailey observed what they coined the “Arnstein Gap” (2010). This gap 
was illustrated largely through the discrepancy between where on Arnstein’s Ladder the citizens 
and professionals desired public participation to be, versus where both felt it was in practice. 
Members of the public desired to be at stage six (partnership) but felt they were actually below 
stage four (consultation). The planning professionals at the same event also desired to be at 
partnership-level, but felt they were actually somewhere above Consultation but below stage five 
(placation). The main takeaway from this gap, as it relates to involving the public in the planning 
process, is that the planners and technocrats felt the public participation process was more 
democratic and citizen-driven than the citizens did. They examined this further, and questioned 
whether the use of SPI would help to mitigate, or even close, the Arnstein Gap. In follow-up 
interviews with members of both groups, the authors found two consistent patterns that would 
seem to confound the Arnstein Gap. In speaking to members of the public, they noted a general 
consensus in favor of technocratic input on the part of planners. That is, respondents stated a 
clear desire to see technically-skilled planners take a leading role in the design-build process. 
The public, at least in this instance, did not desire total control over the process. At the same 
time, when interviewing the planners involved in this meeting, Grossardt and Bailey observed a 
tendency for policymakers to exhibit what Rawls called “Risk-averse behavior” (1971) and listen 
more closely to the input of the technocrats than of the general public. The authors submit that 
these contentions are common at other public meetings, and can be lessened with proper use of 
SPI. The structured transparency, they argue, would allow citizens to openly state what level of 
technical management they are comfortable with in the process, while SPI’s reliance on simple 
and citizen-driven benchmarks would keep planners and facilitators from casually disregarding 
the input of the public. Both of these fixes are essential to equitable transit planning. Most 
citizens lack the technical knowledge to design and build transit systems, so they must be 
comfortable working with engineers and planners who do. And since the citizens will be the ones 
using the transit and paying for it, policymakers must in turn take citizen concerns seriously. 
This research project will argue that part of the reason that transit elections have so consistently 
failed in Kansas City is that most of the ballot initiatives lacked a clear and productive 
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relationship between residents and professional planners. Furthermore, it will be argued, and 
tested with the survey, that citizens place a measurable degree of political trust in city-led 
planning efforts that they do not extend to citizen-led (non-technical) efforts. 
  In seeking to improve public participation in the planning process, one must be prepared 
to engage a new generation of residents with a new generation of methodologies. In 2009, 
Brabham, Sanchez, and Bartholomew conducted a successful public input exercise that 
incorporated both technological innovation and grassroots community creativity. The study 
authors sought to examine the effectiveness of open-source Internet methods (crowdsourcing) in 
gaining public input from diverse groups of residents who might not otherwise be interested in or 
able to attend traditional public meetings. They initially posited two factors that affect the quality 
of traditional public participation arrangements: First, that traditional methods of soliciting and 
integrating public input are usually condensed and/or selective, and never truly representative of 
a community. Second, contextual factors such as location, scheduling, and identity politics are 
easily able to impede the discussion process and silence the contributions of some community 
members. The authors therefore sought a small-scale project in which to test their hypothesis that 
crowdsourcing could lead to a more representative consensus. Using a Federal Transit 
Administration (FTA) grant, they applied crowdsourcing to the public-input process of selecting 
a design for bus stops in the Salt Lake City area. A small subject was chosen due to the 
experimental nature of this process, as well as the reduced potential for a contentious debate 
and/or a costly mistake on the part of the authorities. The experiment was arranged so that 
members of the general public (anyone on Earth with an Internet connection) could submit bus 
stop designs, and each design would be voted on by the same open-access general public. The 
authors theorized, and the experiment showed, that using the Internet can allow for a freer 
transfer of concepts and ideas, both top-down and bottom-up. Using an open-source website 
allowed for a modern version of what Surowiecki called “the wisdom of crowds,” where groups 
of individuals are “often smarter than the smartest individuals in them” (2004). When the authors 
published their paper on this project, it was only partially completed. A final design had not yet 
been selected, but submissions had been uploaded from as far away as India and Germany. The 
project had, however, produced enough data to validate the theories made by the authors. In 
terms of generating website visits and submissions and feedback from participants, the project 
was successful. However, the study’s authors were quick to point out the limitations of 
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crowdsourcing’s success as an effective way to increase quality public participation. They noted 
that crowdsourcing works best with simple and clear proposals, as well as on projects with a 
limited financial, regulatory, and environmental impact. Therefore, this method, while 
revolutionary and quite useful in obtaining more effective public input, has limited appeal as the 
dominant means of gathering residents’ input for a project as massive as planning a major city’s 
light-rail network. Planners cannot simply outsource (or crowdsource) their role as the technical 
and policy minds behind designing such a network. It would, however, be prudent to consider 
crowdsourcing at a later point in the planning process, possibly after the routes have been 
plotted. For example, officials could use crowdsourcing to gain public input on the color and 
general appearance of the transit vehicles, or even the system’s name. While Grossardt et al. 
(2010) may be correct in asserting that voters desire to trust the technical know-how of their city 
planners, there is certainly room in the process for direct citizen-based approval of key 
components. And if said approval can be obtained in the diverse and confrontation-free confines 
of the Internet, then so much the better. 
  As Denhardt and Denhardt (2000) argue, increasing the effectiveness of community 
participation can hinge on the motivations and skillsets of those public administrators who 
organize and moderate discussions with the general public. These two have authored a set of 
professional standards for dealing with the public, what they call the Seven Principles of the New 
Public Service. These principles command, among other things, that administrators serve the 
public’s desires rather than try to steer them toward an outcome preferred by public officials. The 
authors also suggest that administrators think strategically, but act democratically. By following 
these principles uniformly, it is argued, public officials and planners should be able to approach 
public meetings with an open mind and a willingness to alter plans to suit the desires of the 
communities they serve. While the Denhardt and Denhardt study does not specifically relate to 
transit and elections, it makes a valid contribution to the ways in which planning professionals 
should conduct themselves when interacting with the voting public. In a profession where 
overlapping jurisdictions and governmental functions are common, being mindful of these kinds 
of best practices can lend great credibility and trust to planners within their communities, and can 
help to sell a proposal to a skeptical public. 
  Part of the reason for the uneven application of best practices in the public participation 
process is the patchwork of various state and federal mandates regarding the subject. As 
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mentioned previously, the federal government has had citizen-input language in legislation since 
the mid-1950s. The fifty states also have similar mandates within their borders. As Brody, 
Godschalk, and Burby (2003) argue, many of the mandates currently in effect at both levels of 
government are outdated and/or too vague to be effective in the twenty-first century. For 
example, they cite statutes in a few states that mandate public participation in the preplanning 
stage only, whereas other states require public input only at the very end of the process. Some 
state mandates do not even specify a timeframe. A similar patchwork exists for what public input 
methods are considered acceptable for a given state. The authors argue that this inconsistency 
has greatly harmed both the planning profession and the role of ordinary citizens nationwide in 
the transportation-planning process. They recommend the nationwide adoption of uniform state 
standards, with four key updates: Planners should incorporate a wide range of methodologies to 
reach varying stakeholders, agencies should train and retain staff skilled in mediation and public 
participation, planners should be required to seek public input at all stages of the process, and 
they should provide the public with clear and complete data at all stages. Missouri was not one of 
the states studied, but the adoption of such standards there would ensure that whatever transit 
system might eventually be planned for Kansas City would be done with ample public input. 
  One of the two metrics that will be applied to Kansas City’s transit proposals comes from 
an article by Slotterback (2010), that effectively fuses together many of the conclusions 
presented above and lays out a specific path to studying the effectiveness of sound transportation 
planning. This metric is focused mostly on the public-engagement side of a proposal. For her 
research, Slotterback examined the planning process for both transit-oriented developments 
(TODs) and context-sensitive solutions (CSS). For all projects she analyzed, Slotterback found a 
set of six consistently-applied factors that she argues have the potential to make or break a 
planned project. The factors are listed below. Without any one of these, Slotterback argues, a 
project’s integrity among voters can be greatly compromised and it likely will not succeed. A 
portion of this research project will incorporate Slotterback’s six principles in analyzing and 
evaluating the light-rail planning process in Kansas City. Given that the majority of the proposed 
plans over the years were citizen-led initiatives that lacked either municipal backing or 
engineering and planning input (Spivak, 2007), it can be inferred that the process did not meet 
the technical or communications standards of the Slotterback method. Whether these six factors 
are the key explanatory variables for the Kansas City case will be determined in chapter 4. 
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The Slotterback Metric’s Six Factors for Transit Proposal Success 
 The presence of a local (and reputable) champion 
 A mixed-methods approach to gathering and integrating public input 
 A clearly defined sense of the desired outcome(s) 
 A local political establishment willing to stake credibility on the proposal 
 A planning team with significant design expertise 
 The use of effective visual tools when presenting the proposal to the voters 
Note: List originally compiled by Slotterback (2010), compiled here by Wood (2013). 
 
While Slotterback’s methodology explores the factors affecting the interaction between 
planners and residents, and works well in examining the quality of the citizen/policymaker 
relationship in the case of transit in Kansas City, an additional metric must be applied to the 
political campaigns of these transit initiatives and proposals. One such metric, created and later 
applied by Haas, Massey, Valenty, and Werbel (2000), functions much like Slotterback’s metric 
and is tailored to assess the probability of a proposal/initiative’s success based on a set of criteria 
that grew over the course of several research projects using the same formula. In each case, Haas 
and his colleagues examined multiple cases of transit-related tax increases in various American 
cities. The studies focused primarily on the campaign strategies of the pro-transit factions, and 
also examined each city’s demographic data for context. While the first project bore only a few 
general findings, each successive replication produced more specific and verifiable conclusions 
that could thus be used as criteria to determine the likelihood of success in a given city. 
The first paper by Haas et al. (2000), found six explanatory variables, two regional- and 
four campaign-specific, that showed promise in assessing a transit campaign’s effectiveness and 
likelihood of success. For regional factors, they found that campaigns are more likely to succeed 
if at least nine percent of the region’s population is elderly or retired. Also, campaigns are 
unlikely to succeed in regions with already-high sales taxes. Regarding the proponents’ 
campaign strategies, the authors concluded that a campaign wishing to succeed should follow 
their four key findings: First, a budget cap and/or “sunset” provision should be provided in 
detail, so voters understand the limits of their fiscal contribution. Second, construction and 
service priorities should be based on a wide range of passenger inputs, so the plan could appeal 
to voters of all demographics and living situations. Third, the proposal should include a 
multimodal list of improvements, again so it could appeal to voters of all stripes. Finally, they 
found that organized opposition to the transit proposal should be anticipated and always rebutted 
14 
 
rationally, so that voters are not misled by irrational statements or rumors. The authors concluded 
by advising that gaining voter approval for a transit-related tax hike is an uphill battle for 
policymakers, despite the continued trend of polling data in favor of transit. However, the 
consistency of the initial six findings and their presence in cities that approved transit plans (or 
their absence in cities that rejected plans), make for a good set of transit campaign benchmarks. 
A year after the initial study, Haas and Werbel (2001) applied the explanatory variables 
from the initial paper to eleven additional cities where transit campaigns had recently taken 
place. The initial variables produced few anomalies in the analysis, further proving their 
effectiveness at assessing the viability of a transit campaign. In addition to analyzing the 
performance of the existing factors, Haas and Werbel were able to draw eleven additional 
findings from this study. These supplemental findings were generally more specific but still 
closely related to the original variables. This initial vindication of the Haas metric, further 
confirmed by the subsequent study, indicates its validity in assessing the past and future 
performance of a transit-tax ballot proposal in a city such as Kansas City. 
The third and most comprehensive study undertaken by this group (Haas and Estrada, 
2011), was both a replication and an expansion of the 2001 study. This project, undertaken a 
decade after the previous iteration, examined the original research questions in a vastly different 
political and economic climate. In contrast to the prosperous period of the 2001 study, the United 
States of 2011 was in the midst of significant economic turmoil, casting reasonable doubt on the 
previous assumptions about voters’ willingness to fund large capital projects. The nation’s 
politics had also changed in those ten years. While the advent of social media in the late 2000s 
revolutionized the ways in which governments and political campaigns communicated with 
ordinary citizens, the emergence of organized opposition to taxation and government expansion 
(the Tea Party movement) added a new dynamic to the political process in the United States, 
particularly among campaigns seeking to levy new taxes to fund government-administered 
transportation. In further contrast to the previous two studies, this project directly analyzed the 
study cases with the seventeen factors. This third paper was able to further confirm many of the 
trends that emerged in the second paper, namely the importance of consensus and support among 
a region’s business and political leaders as well as the value of hiring experienced strategists to 
oversee the campaign. One notable new finding in 2011 that applies directly to Kansas City is 
the potential impact of what Haas and Estrada termed a “rebound election,” in which a losing 
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campaign re-engages voters for the next available election. The results from the 2011 study are 
mixed, with some of the “rebound” cases succeeding on the second try and others not. Kansas 
City was featured in the project, and the case study focused on the curious period between 
Kansas City voters’ approval of a citizen-authored regional LRT network in 2006 and their 
subsequent rejection of a pared-down and city-designed proposal in 2008. The factors leading to 
the shift were outlined to a certain extent by Haas and Estrada in their analysis, and will be more 
thoroughly investigated as part of this project.  
The Haas Metric’s Seventeen Factors of a Successful and Politically-Viable Transit Proposal 
 Robust public participation during the development of the proposal 
 An existing transit provider with a reputation for reliability and efficiency 
 A wide geographic distribution of benefits for users 
 Citywide traffic congestion at a “tipping point” 
 Support from the region’s business community and chamber of commerce 
 Support from elected officials and city employees 
 A well-funded ($1 million or more) marketing campaign 
 Experience/familiarity with similar proposals in recent elections 
 Visible support from environmentalists 
 Funding for multiple modes of mass transit 
 Funding for highway and arterial improvements 
 Sunset of twenty years or less if a proposed tax 
 Extending an existing network (versus starting a new system) 
 Concurrence with a congressional or presidential election 
 An experienced consultant leading the marketing campaign 
 Multimedia advertising 
 An unorganized and/or underfunded opposition 
Note: List originally compiled by Haas and Werbel, 2001. 
On the whole, research into these two aspects of the transit-campaign process has thus far 
demonstrated several points of consensus. Regarding public engagement, the studies explored 
here all declare public participation in the planning process to be a noble, and even essential, part 
of urban planning in the current era. Beyond simply fulfilling the various state and federal 
mandates requiring planners to seek and integrate public input into capital projects, the literature 
seems to place public input at the forefront of the planning process. True to the post-Jane Jacobs 
era, the studies presuppose (and are frequently designed with the explicit understanding) that the 
needs and desires of city residents are the primary force behind urban planning, and that the role 
of planners is to influence and guide, but never to compel, this public energy toward the 
equitable and efficient solutions that the general public may or may not know they desire. In the 
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spirit of this ethos of the “benevolent planner,” this research project will focus many of its 
diagnostic tools on the flaws in the steering phase of Kansas City’s many transit proposals.  
Less evident from the literature, but no less important to the understanding of Kansas 
City’s transit story, is the assertion by several of the above authors that transit tax campaigns, no 
matter how dry or technical they may be, must be administered with victory in mind. This aspect 
of the literature, while rarely labeled as such in the existing literature, requires a level of political 
analysis not often applied in transportation-planning circles. The interdisciplinary approach 
required to solve this dilemma gives this project unique potential to expand the knowledge base 
of the literature of both urban political affairs and transportation planning. Much of the above 
literature alludes to the inherent connections between political action and transportation 
planning, but the body of research on these linkages is both limited and difficult to generalize. It 
is hoped that this project will produce quantifiable results that apply both locally and nationally. 
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Chapter 3 – Historical Overview of Light Rail in Kansas City 
 In 1992, at the behest of recently-elected Mayor Emanuel Cleaver, Kansas City and the 
Mid-America Regional Council (the Kansas City region’s Metropolitan Planning Organization) 
created an ambitious new comprehensive plan for the city. The FOCUS (Forging Our 
Comprehensive Urban Strategy) Plan was designed to guide the city’s growth and infrastructure 
for fifty years, and was Kansas City’s most inclusive and citizen-led planning effort to date 
(Menninger, 1998). Thousands of participants from across the city provided input and survey 
data, and the resulting plan featured broad goals on land use, redevelopment, and urban 
infrastructure. The transportation section is particularly noteworthy, in that it recommended the 
creation of a network of commuter rail, light-rail, and urban bus and trolley lines. While the 
FOCUS Plan provided ambitious goals for transit in Kansas City, few of the proposed lines were 
seriously considered by the city or KCATA. Part of this can be attributed to the political and 
legal distinction between the government of Kansas City, Missouri and the bi-state KCATA. One 
agency’s plan, no matter how detailed or well-intentioned, may not be accepted or implemented 
by another agency’s planners. The city’s auto-oriented ethos and often gridlock-free highway 
network may be another explanation for the failure of these plans to see serious consideration by 
the relevant authorities. Still, it was this document’s proposed routes that would provide the core 
of what planners, civic boosters, and one pugnacious citizen-activist would suggest for Kansas 
City’s first light-rail line over the course of a decade of controversial elections. A summary of 
these elections is shown in Table 3.1. 
 While light-rail transit, in its modern-day form, has been a part of Kansas City’s regional 
transportation plan since 1975 (Menninger, 1998), it was not until the passage of the Intermodal 
Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) in 1991 that regional planning authorities were 
given the impetus and federal funding to conduct a formal feasibility study. The text of the Act 
explicitly provided funds for a regional engineering and analysis-of-alternatives study to further 
the planning of a light-rail system for metro Kansas City (ISTEA, 1991). The study was 
completed the following year, without much controversy or fanfare, and proposed a series of 
generally-vague routes throughout the city. Many of these routes were similar or identical to 
those mentioned in the FOCUS plan. However, a follow-up study commissioned by a downtown 
business association suggested specific streets and neighborhoods for the aforementioned 
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system, and it was at this point that the concept of light-rail planning became contentious among 
neighborhood and civic leaders (Menninger, 1998). 
Table 3.1: Light-Rail Initiatives and Proposals, 1997-2008 
Year Proponent Date of 
Election 






1997 Clay Chastain 11/04/97 To construct a transit hub at 
Union Station 
$30 million 33%-67% 
1998 Clay Chastain 11/03/98 25 miles of light-rail, from 
Union Station to KCI 
$600 million 45%-55% 
1999 Clay Chastain 11/02/99 50 miles of light-rail in three 
spurs spanning the metro area 
$1.5 billion 37%-63% 
2000 Clay Chastain 11/07/00 32-mile light-rail line from 
Waldo to KCI 
$980 million 39%-61% 
2001 City of 
Kansas City 
08/07/01 24 miles of light-rail, from 
Kansas City Zoo to Northland 
$793 million 40%-60% 
2002 Clay Chastain 11/05/02 Short-run trolley routes, and 




2003 Clay Chastain 11/12/03 Same route as 1998 initiative, 
fed by bus rapid transit network 
$650 million 36%-64% 
2006 Clay Chastain 11/07/06 27 miles of light-rail, from 
Kansas City Zoo to KCI 
$1.5 billion 53%-47% 
2008 City of 
Kansas City 
11/04/08 14 miles of light-rail, from 
Country Club Plaza to Northland 
$815 million 45%-55% 
Note: Bold-italics indicates ballot measure was successful 
  By late 1996 and early 1997, KCATA was ready to design and seek funding for the first 
light-rail line in the city. However, complications arose once they announced their intentions, 
and KCATA soon found itself engaged in a very public debate with the mayor, the Chamber of 
Commerce, and area business leaders over the mere concept of light-rail (Abouhalkah, 2003). 
After months of acrimonious back-and-forth between transportation planners and some of the 
city’s wealthiest businessmen, the final starter line was announced: From the River Market to the 
Country Club Plaza. This route, which would have run directly adjacent to the downtown offices 
of major Chamber officials while connecting the city’s main urban tourist draws, drew 
immediate consternation from civic leaders and Mayor Cleaver, who denounced the line’s lack 
of linkages between area residents and their jobs. His labeling of the project as “touristy frou-
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frou” would overshadow the debate over light-rail for the next decade. Still, KCATA, with the 
help of then-congresswoman Karen McCarthy (D-MO), secured $162,000 to conduct fresh 
engineering and feasibility studies on the now-finalized starter route. At the same time, Congress 
authorized a further $1.5 million in initial funding for the system, which was to have been 
disbursed upon adoption of a formal light-rail plan by the city council (Roth, 1997). Such 
approval would not come easily, as Mayor Cleaver had already derided the six-mile route in 
public and had refused to devote city resources to the project or to seek direct federal funding 
from U.S. Senator Kit Bond or Transportation Secretary Rodney Slater. Without the support of 
Kansas City’s mayor or business establishment, the six-mile proposal never got past the planning 
stages. Still, this public battle went on for months, and by November, Kansas City residents were 
ready to head to the polls to vent their frustrations at the one item on that year’s ballot that so 
much as mentioned “light-rail.” Unfortunately for one local citizen-activist, the item targeted for 
defeat was his hard-fought initiative seeking a citywide vote to bring a new transit-based purpose 
to the city’s iconic Union Station. 
 The story of Clay Chastain, the activist who in a few short years went from being a small-
scale real-estate developer and architectural preservationist to the most polarizing Kansas Citian 
since Depression-era political boss Tom Pendergast, is an interesting chain of events that has 
scarcely been examined in an academic context. Trained as an electrical engineer, Chastain 
immersed himself in the role of petitioner and urbanist throughout the early 1990s. In 1992 and 
1993, he gathered enough petition signatures to place an initiative on the city ballot to fund the 
restoration and reuse of Union Station. This building, once a grand Beaux-Arts railway terminal 
and a quintessential architectural icon of Kansas City, was by this time disused and in poor 
structural condition. Chastain’s petitions sought public funds to restore the building for use as 
both an Amtrak station and a community space with a museum and conference center (Chastain, 
1998). In both 1992 and 1993, the petitions submitted by Chastain were accepted as valid by the 
City Clerk of Kansas City, but were rejected and struck from the city ballot by the City Council. 
Soon after the second rejection, Chastain launched a third petition drive, this time to recall 
Mayor Cleaver from office. After falling far short of the required amount of signatures for a 
recall, Chastain ended his campaign and resumed his efforts at restoring and reusing Union 
Station. In these early years, he was supported by a small but vocal base of residents, largely in 
the upper-class Brookside neighborhood south of the Country Club Plaza. Brooksiders signed his 
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petitions based largely on their shared affection for historic preservation and the arts, but also 
because it was outside the grocery store in the Brookside shopping center that Chastain usually 
stood to gather petition signatures (Chastain, 1998).  
1997 Initiative 
Chastain began his fourth petition drive in 1996-97, in the midst of the public battle over 
light rail and “touristy frou-frou,” only with a notable change. In 1996, a coalition of city 
officials and business leaders outmaneuvered Chastain and drew up a detailed proposal for the 
restoration and reuse of Union Station, calling for architectural restoration, the relocation of 
Amtrak’s terminal back into the old station, and the construction of a children’s science museum 
at the site. The plan sailed to victory in that year, and Union Station was quickly abuzz with new 
construction. While Chastain had lost ownership of his original goal of restoring the old terminal, 
he quickly found a new concept on which to base his next move. He examined both the language 
of the city’s successful Union Station proposal and of the FOCUS regional plan, and found 
wording that suggested the station be used as a multi-modal transit hub for the city (Chastain, 
1998). He wrote this concept into the language of his proposal, which called for Union Station to 
be transformed into a regional transit hub, hosting Amtrak platforms as well as facilities for 
commuter rail, city bus, and regional light-rail. The plan was light on technical details, had no 
accompanying engineering study, and lacked a clear funding mechanism beyond the extension of 
an existing citywide sales tax and nebulous goals of securing federal matching dollars for the 
estimated $30 million cost. As the city government and local business leaders burned up the 
airwaves and editorial pages with arguments for and against light-rail, Chastain’s petition drive 
was drumming up support for the concept among many of the city’s wealthiest and most 
civically-active residents. And so, whether by coincidence or by design, it happened to be that 
these two ostensibly unrelated, yet somehow mutually-informing, light-rail discussions were 
taking place in Kansas City for most of 1997. However, by November, the wave of curiosity 
about light-rail in Kansas City had become a tsunami of skepticism, and Chastain’s ballot 
initiative was wiped out in a 33-67% defeat on November 4.  
 In the wake of the 1997 debate, civic and city leaders undertook a strategy of passively 
supporting the concept of regional light-rail transit in speeches and campaign literature, while at 
the same time declining to help area planning agencies secure new federal funds for studies or 
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conceptual designs. Planners in Kansas City were faced with a deteriorated situation: The city 
was as transit-poor as it had ever been, but they now had to contend with a risk-averse political 
establishment unwilling to expend political capital on transit, as well as a voting public that, year 
after year, came to associate any public discussion of light-rail with the controversial character of 
Clay Chastain instead of with the data-driven aspirations of MARC or KCATA. This guilt-by-
association would endure for the next decade, and would more than any other single factor lead 
to defeat for all but one light-rail question that appeared on city ballots in that period. 
1998 Initiative 
 Mere weeks after the 1997 initiative failed, Chastain set to work gathering fresh 
signatures for an initiative to be placed on the 1998 ballot. This time, he undertook a more 
detailed approach. First, to increase turnout, he hoped that sharing the ballot with the 
congressional midterm election. Second, instead of focusing on Union Station and leaving the 
light-rail routes for later planning, he proposed building a specific route from Union Station to 
Kansas City International Airport, nearly thirty miles to the north. Third, he was more detailed in 
his funding proposal. For this concept, funding would have come from extending a half-cent city 
sales tax from Jan. 1, 2001 to Dec. 31, 2005, which would have raised an estimated $150 million. 
Half of this would have been spent on repairing the city’s decaying stock of bridges, and the 
other half would have been used to leverage state/federal matching funds for light-rail. Chastain 
estimated, based on unnamed sources, that construction of the line from Union Station to the 
airport would cost $600 million (Rodgers, 1998). While he launched his second light-rail attempt 
from a more solid base of facts, he still proceeded without technical input from planners or 
engineers. He relied solely on the city’s FOCUS documents, which, like nearly all 
comprehensive plans, was written in intentionally vague aspirations rather than concrete and 
data-driven directives. Chastain provided no study of suitable alignment options, and aside from 
suggesting which bridge the line should use to cross the Missouri River, his plan made no 
mention of what neighborhoods the line would go through or where potential stops would be 
placed (Rodgers, 1998). This initiative was opposed by the Neighborhoods First Committee, a 
coalition of suburban neighborhood associations, several suburban-based members of the City 
Council, and by the Greater KC Chamber (Bogdon, 1998). The suburban neighborhood 
organizations, even those in the vaguely-defined Northland area through which the line would 
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pass, opposed Question 2 because the funding mechanism – the half-cent city sales tax that 
would have been extended through 2005 – was originally created to fund neighborhood 
improvements across the city, and the bulk of those funds would have been redistributed to the 
light-rail line instead (Rodgers, 1998). Mayor Cleaver maintained his position that the city 
government would only support a light-rail network that connected residents to jobs, and by that 
standard, this concept was no different than the KCATA alignment from 1997 (Menninger, 
1998).  In promoting Question 2, Chastain argued that light-rail was “Kansas City’s ticket to a 
better future,” while also promoting the energy savings of his proposal (Rodgers, 1998). While 
gathering signatures to get Question 2 onto the municipal ballot, Chastain framed the petition as 
a “citizen veto” of the Chamber’s vocal assertion that year that the Kansas City business and 
political establishment had no reason to support light-rail in the city. Despite the improved 
strategy employed by Chastain, or perhaps because of it, Question 2 failed at the ballot box, 45-
55%. This would for the next eight years be the high-point of popularity for Chastain’s light-rail 
ideas, although there would be several more attempts at improving his odds. 
 Alongside his lack of technical specifics, one glaring flaw in Question 2 was, as in 
Chastain’s other proposals, the expectation of massive sums of matching funds from the federal 
government and the State of Missouri. While Chastain’s assertion that the federal government 
often did fund up to 80% of an urban transit project may have been somewhat accurate, he 
overlooked the fact that the United States Department of Transportation, particularly under 
Secretaries Rodney Slater and Norman Mineta, tended to be wary of transit plans that lacked 
technical expertise or the support of local elected officials (Burby, 2003). Another noteworthy 
omission, which will be explored in Chapter 5, was his lack of public input in the process. While 
Chastain’s initiatives were by definition backed by the signatures of thousands of Kansas Citians, 
his ideas were never explicitly formulated by groups of engaged Kansas City residents. He 
conducted his own research, he gathered signatures personally, and he was the sole designer of 
the routes proposed in his initiatives (Chastain, 1998). While this direct approach may have 
helped increase the speed of the notoriously-slow petition process, it also served to place the 
entire citywide discussion about light-rail under the name and increasingly-polarizing ego of 
Clay Chastain. Slotterback argues that a transportation election may live or die by the reputation 
of its local champions (2010), and in the case of light-rail in Kansas City, the issue became less 
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about transit and more about Chastain himself. The quantifiable impacts of this will be examined 
further in Chapter 5. 
1999 Initiative 
 After the close defeat of the 1998 initiative, Chastain did what he would do several times 
in this period: He started a fresh petition drive for the same idea. Working closely with his 
previous concept, only this time changing the general areas of the starter lines, he quickly 
obtained the necessary 3,900 signatures and set to work selling his third light-rail plan in as 
many years. For this plan, he proposed extending a half-cent sales tax from 2000 to 2012, in 
order to raise $500 million for a multi-modal system crisscrossing the metro area. Again drawing 
from the FOCUS plan for regional light rail, Chastain designed the system to have four main 
lines radiating outward from Union Station and Crown Center in the central city (Dobson, 
1999a). Chastain’s plan was designed to meet the selection criteria for the Federal Transportation 
Livability Initiative, a competitive transportation and Smart Growth program that was being 
heavily promoted by the Clinton-Gore administration in their final two years in office. 
Applications for the nationwide program were expected to be fiercely competitive, and since 
Chastain’s plan would have sought nearly a billion dollars in federal matching funds, he was 
eager to persuade voters to approve his idea and thus legitimize it in the eyes of FTA officials.  
 As with the 1998 initiative, Chastain would pursue political victory without the 
endorsement of City Hall or the Chamber of Commerce. However, this was not because those 
organizations had lost interest in light-rail. In fact, mere days after Chastain’s 1998 initiative was 
rejected, MARC and the Kansas City Chamber released a joint study showing that an improved 
and multi-modal transit network in Kansas City, much like the one outlined by the FOCUS plan 
and Clay Chastain, would more than double transit trips in the region, from 14.7 million to 34.2 
million or more (Dobson, 1999b). This report further concluded that Kansas City residents would 
see “permanency and efficiency” in a rail-based system, and would be willing to support it with 
tax dollars and ridership. Based on this input, MARC and the Chamber continued to stress their 
support for light-rail in the abstract, while continuing to blast the technical failings of Chastain’s 
plans. Chastain also had a fresh detractor in Kansas City’s new mayor, Kay Waldo Barnes, who 
had been elected in the spring of 1999. Barnes had spent several years on the City Council, and 
was supportive of light-rail in the same abstract sense as most city leaders, but was openly 
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critical of Chastain’s plans from the start of her administration. She was particularly critical of 
Chastain’s lack of public involvement in his designs, arguing that something as expensive and 
expansive as the proposed light-rail network should receive voluminous input from the public 
(Dobson, 1999b). Barnes would refine this criticism throughout her eight years as Kansas City’s 
mayor, pointing out again and again that Chastain’s concepts never sought the public’s input 
beyond the act of signing his petition forms. This direct critique of his methodology struck the 
core of the colorful populism that was evolving within the man and his tactics as he continued to 
lose both elections and goodwill among the voters. What had begun as a seemingly genuine 
effort to move a bold idea through the grassroots of Kansas City’s voting public evolved within a 
few years into a quasi-Quixotic and increasingly vitriolic campaign against the civic leaders 
Chastain perceived as obstacles to his concepts’ success. Rather than heed the direct criticism 
that his plans were grandiose and unworkable, he kept drawing them bigger and more elaborate. 
Rather than trust in the sluggish but legitimate bureaucracy involved in planning a transit 
network from scratch, he derided technical reports from MARC and accused his detractors of 
colluding with the Chamber of Commerce to keep Kansas City sprawling and dependent on 
autos and new suburban-home and freeway construction (Chastain, 1998). By November of 
1999, his public relationship with City Hall and the new mayor had sunk to a depth of negativity 
and mutual distrust that would become permanent. His 1999 initiative failed, 37% to 63%, and 
Clay Chastain cemented his reputation among city leaders as a volatile and intractable force not 
to be aided, or even debated, by city resources. The gulf between these two voices was, for better 
or worse, what defined the conversation over light-rail in Kansas City until at least 2008. The 
city’s transit system, and the city’s residents themselves, would bear the direct cost of this 
political stalemate, and it was far from over in 1999. 
2000 Initiative 
 After his nearly 2-1 defeat in 1999, Clay Chastain vowed very publicly to stop his 
petition drives and leave Kansas City for good. He sold the last of his properties in Kansas City 
and traveled to several small towns in the Southeast, purportedly looking for a fresh start 
(Dobson, 2000). But mere months later, Chastain returned to Kansas City to try again. His plan 
for 2000 was bigger and bolder than anything he had envisioned before. To improve his odds of 
success, he timed that year’s initiative for the November general election, which was to feature 
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both a close presidential election and a high-profile senate race in Missouri. Also, in contrast to 
previous years, Chastain researched and mapped city-owned rights-of-way that he integrated into 
his proposal as a way to reduce acquisition costs. While his proposal focused once again on a 
route from downtown to the airport, this was the first of his light-rail initiatives to delineate, 
down to the specific tracts of land, where the system would be built. Finally, the funding 
mechanism for this proposal was unlike his previous suggestions. This time, instead of extending 
and re-appropriating an existing tax, he suggested a 20-year, half-cent sales tax dedicated 
exclusively to light-rail.  
 Still, Chastain’s proposal lacked that vital connection to the city’s political establishment, 
even as civic leaders grudgingly admitted that his efforts were a strong presence in the city’s 
discussion of light-rail. One leader of the Regional Transit Alliance (RTA), a local organization 
of transit advocates, applauded Chastain’s tenacity in promoting the concept of light-rail in 
Kansas City, but lamented his continued unwillingness to compromise or work with city planners 
or transit advocates outside of his core base of supporters (Dobson, 2000). Around the time of 
Chastain’s 2000 initiative, the RTA had over 600 members, many of them influential business 
and neighborhood figures, and an alliance between Mr. Chastain and this advocacy group would 
have given substantial gravitas to a push for light-rail that year. However, Chastain never 
attended RTA meetings or sought their endorsement for his plans in 2000 or any year afterward. 
In interviews, he generally defended his lone-ranger tactics as taking immediate action to solve a 
major problem that the city’s political leaders were content to study and discuss ad infinitum 
(Dobson, 2000). On Election Night that November, as Missouri voters elected a dead candidate 
over a living incumbent senator, and as Americans realized it would be several weeks before 
they knew who their next president would be, Chastain’s fourth initiative in as many years was 
defeated almost as soundly as the previous year’s, 39%-61%. In the aftermath of this defeat, 
Chastain finally did take the break from petition-gathering that he had promised the year before. 
He was not finished making his attempts, though he did spend most of the following eighteen 
months involved in a series of acrimonious libel lawsuits against several Kansas City pundits 
who criticized his light-rail initiatives in print and on air (Rodgers, 2000). These lawsuits, against 
some of Kansas City’s most visible media personalities, caused significant political fallout for 
Chastain, and journalists like Rodgers openly wondered whether Chastain’s increasingly public 
pettiness might be the ultimate undoing of this heretofore unstoppable activist. After Chastain’s 
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fourth defeat, the city government finally appeared prepared to launch a proper political 
campaign to get a professionally-designed light-rail system on a citywide ballot. But at this point, 
it was an open question as to whether city voters would be willing or able to make the distinction 
between the two. 
2001 Proposal 
 For most of 2000, planners at MARC were quietly laying the groundwork for a serious 
city-backed campaign for light-rail. Mayor Barnes appointed over a hundred Kansas City 
residents to a mix of route-planning committees, and the city sought and obtained “placeholder” 
funding in the 2002 federal budget, to be spent if and when the city’s plan was approved by 
voters (Logan, 2001). Part of the city’s increased interest in light-rail was due to the new mayor, 
who was an outspoken advocate of building capital projects to enhance the city’s national 
profile, but another motivation for City Hall’s suddenly-energized push was witnessing four 
years of Clay Chastain’s self-designed light-rail plans garner a steady stream of 30-45% of “yes” 
votes in successive years. The city likely reasoned that they could muster at least that much 
support for their in-house plan, and gain a solid majority of votes by incorporating professional 
design, proper public outreach, and a marketing campaign with far more resources than any of 
Chastain’s attempts. As they did in 1996-97, the city settled upon a starter-line and quickly 
announced it to city voters. The timing was a critical component. Since the project would depend 
on vast sums of federal matching funds, it would have to be approved by voters and submitted 
for FTA consideration before Congress finalized transportation appropriations in the fall of 2001, 
or else wait until the next window of mass-transit grants, which was projected for 2007. Also, 
unlike Chastain’s first four initiatives, this vision for light-rail in Kansas City laid out precisely 
where each stop would be placed, and how each segment would interact with existing and future 
transit connections.  
Kansas City’s 2001 light-rail proposal included the following projections: 
 A total length of 23.8 miles 
 A total capital cost of $793 million 
 Federal funding match of $475 million 
 Funded by a half-cent sales tax levied citywide 
 15,700 daily riders 
 An operating budget of $15 million per year 
 $1.1 billion in future private investment adjacent to stops 
Note: Figures in 2001 dollars 
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 An overview of the proposal can be seen above. The route would have been 24 miles 
long, and run from a proposed park-and-ride in the Northland suburbs almost due south across 
the River, through downtown, and ending several miles south of the CBD near the Kansas City 
Zoo. The city also touted the robust involvement of the citizen committees that helped design the 
route (Logan, 2001). One key strategic choice for the city’s campaign was a focus on 
redevelopment potential along the starter route. In addition to showing where the specific stops 
would be, the campaign also informed the public about transit-oriented development at key 
nodes along the route. The hefty 77-page proposal drawn up by the design team touted the 
statistic of 150,000 Kansas Citians residing within a mile of the route, along with an estimated 
254,000 jobs (“Kansas City’s Light Rail Option,” 2001). The city engaged focus groups during 
the route-selection phase, organized a skilled design team of planners and developers, and gave 
presentations to neighborhood associations and chamber of commerce meetings across the metro 
area. In essence, the city set out to do everything that Clay Chastain neglected to do when it 
came to selling transit to car-dependent and tax-wary Kansas City voters. Still, it was another 
contentious summer as the debate rolled toward the election in early August of 2001, and many 
of the improved tactics used by the city’s transit campaigners would be deftly matched by 
improved criticisms from the business community and several vocal residents along the proposed 
route. City officials would quickly learn that being the “anti-Chastain” would only amount to so 
much political progress among the voters. 
 As with the last time the city attempted to foster a discussion about light-rail, the most 
vocal opponent was the Kansas City Chamber of Commerce. While the Chamber had for years 
maintained their vague support for effective transit in the metro area, they came out strongly 
against the city’s proposal based largely on the city’s figures illustrated in Table 4.2. In an open 
letter to the city, published four weeks prior to the 2001 election, the Chamber argued that the 
system under consideration would cost far too much in tax dollars for far too little public benefit 
(P. Levi, letter to Chamber members, July 11, 2001). They pointed out that the line in question 
was projected to carry less than 16,000 passengers per day, most of whom were already riding 
buses on the same general route. They then strongly urged the city, and the voters, to focus on 
the city’s backlog of infrastructure repairs and the existing network of buses. The Chamber’s 
very public rejection of the city’s plan stirred controversy in the weeks leading up to the vote, 
and the very specific critiques of the city’s figures and goals greatly undermined the 2001 
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proposal’s status as a light-rail plan drawn up by mindful experts. The Chamber was not alone in 
publicly blasting the plan. Neighborhood associations along all segments of the proposed route 
spoke out against the plan, with several homeowners in one neighborhood claiming their area 
was already being scouted by developers known for gaining eminent-domain powers to 
redevelop high-density residential properties (Logan, 2001). This public fear of a potential land-
grab, which was compounded by the city’s apparent unwillingness to dispel the rumors at a set of 
public meetings throughout that summer, swayed many of the Midtown and Brookside 
homeowners (many of whom had eagerly supported Chastain’s initiatives) against the city’s 
proposal. As the election grew nearer, and as public opposition to the plan swelled only to meet 
silence from City Hall, the proposal appeared destined for defeat. On August 7
th
 of 2001, the 
carefully-crafted but poorly-defended city plan for light-rail was defeated by Kansas City voters, 
40%-60%. 
 Even though the city employed several tried-and-true tactics to win the election, their 
efforts lacked a lot of what Slotterback would later characterize as a proper transit-issue 
campaign. Just as a successful political campaign presents a candidate and defends his or her 
positions against partisan attack, so too should a successful transit campaign be prepared to rebut 
criticism and allay public concerns. The organizers of the city’s transit campaign were much 
more adept at presenting a well-planned route than Clay Chastain, but they seemed to devote few 
resources to defending it politically. The charges laid out in the Chamber’s open letter were 
obvious and well-reasoned critiques of the proposed starter line, but no one from City Hall 
appears to have rebutted them publicly. Nor was any attempt made by planners or 
councilmembers to put to rest homeowners’ fears that a land-grab would result from building 
light-rail stations in their neighborhoods. This last point sheds light on a curious behavior of 
urban voters, namely that they seem to expect a much greater degree of transparency and honesty 
from their government than from an activist with a petition sheet, even when the two parties are 
proposing essentially identical ideas. There is scant evidence that the Brookside and Midtown 
homeowners, many of whom supported Chastain for four years prior to this, were at all 
concerned about eminent-domain and land-grabs when he was proposing light-rail for several 
Kansas City neighborhoods. It was not until the city produced a data-packed report on the subject 
that residents found reason to worry. And therein lies another curious double-standard for city-
backed versus citizen-initiated transit proposals: Voters ostensibly value expertise and 
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transparent information, but it would also seem that presenting them with new and detailed 
information also leads to new questions and the potential for fresh controversies. It was in this 
twisted mire of undefended accusations, unanticipated controversies, and a baffling catch-22 on 
the part of voter expectations that the city’s first full attempt at a light-rail proposition became 
immobilized. In the wake of its proposition’s defeat, the city’s political establishment moved on 
from light-rail. Mayor Barnes and the Chamber were able to unite in pursuit of downtown 
redevelopment and a new downtown arena, both of which would be well-accomplished by the 
close of the 2000s. When the city and its moneyed/technocratic resources left the light-rail 
debate in 2001, it left an outsized void in the discussion that not even Clay Chastain could fill. 
But he would try nonetheless. 
2002 Initiative 
 For 2002, Chastain mounted an uncharacteristically quiet initiative. While there may 
have been some political vindication in witnessing the city’s attempt at light-rail sink as easily as 
his own repeated attempts, the nation’s political priorities changed in the fall of 2001. With the 
visible prosperity of the dot-com boom now gone, and with a population now focused on the new 
War on Terror, there was virtually no place in Kansas City politics for a discussion about transit. 
Also occurring during this time was Clay Chastain’s move out of state. The man who had for 
years pledged to leave town after each of his ballot initiatives failed had finally done so, 
resettling in rural Tennessee (Martin, 2006). Despite having left the city, Chastain still was not 
finished with Kansas City’s transit needs. He returned to gather petition signatures for a 2002 
initiative, one that was focused primarily on building a network of bicycle and pedestrian trails 
throughout the city. There was a transit component attached, but it was limited to short-run 
trolleys and a small streetcar line. Examining the press coverage of local politics in that year, one 
finds virtually no mention of Chastain or his 2002 initiative. Even the Kansas City Star, which 
had for years harshly editorialized against every one of his proposals, was silent that year. 
Clearly, Chastain had finally crossed into political exile, and even Chastain himself seemed 
resigned to defeat that year. His 2002 trails and trolleys initiative, though it gathered enough 
signatures to appear on the ballot that year, failed 35%-65%. Again uncharacteristically for a 
man whose outspoken narcissism often led him to compare himself to Jesus Christ in media 
interviews (Martin, 2006, et al.), Chastain left Kansas City quietly after the defeat, granting no 
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interviews to area journalists who had long since become accustomed to his media savvy and 
omnipresent self-promotion. During this initiative drive, and the one that would follow the next 
year, Chastain seemed to be operating on automatic-pilot. He proposed the same sort of transit 
networks, funded by the same sources of tax dollars, and sought public input from the same 
Brookside neighborhoods he always had. For a man who seemed to thrive on public attention 
and controversy, Chastain seemed to have little energy for a prolonged fight once the media and 
the political establishment stopped caring.  
2003 Initiative   
 Much of this disinterest carried over to Chastain’s 2003 initiative, which consisted of his 
typical airport-to-downtown light-rail route, plus provisions for bus rapid transit (BRT) and a 
long-term transit endowment. This was the first of Chastain’s plans to make use of BRT in 
Kansas City, the groundwork for which had been laid that year through a federal grant to 
establish the city’s first BRT route in Midtown (Martin, 2006). What was most remarkable about 
this initiative, aside from Chastain’s temporary relocation from another state, was its unexpected 
inclusion of bus-based transit options. For years, Chastain had blasted buses as “old-fashioned” 
and a mode incapable of attracting white-collar commuters (Chastain, 1998), but in this instance, 
he seemed willing to try the novelty of BRT if it would improve the viability of his proposed 
system. As mentioned previously, Mayor Barnes and the Chamber of Commerce were devoting 
great attention to downtown redevelopment and a new NBA/NHL-capable downtown arena, and 
the city’s urban planning community was still reeling from the 2001 defeat. Virtually no one 
spoke out in favor of light-rail at this time, nor did anyone prominent take the time to rebut 
Chastain’s latest idea or warn the public to vote it down that year. For the second year in a row, 
Chastain met the city’s expectations while at the same time defying his own personality for a 
second time. His 2003 attempt received a vote typical of Chastain’s ideas, 36%-64%, and he 
quietly left Kansas City once again.  
 After the 2003 vote, Clay Chastain would take a break from light-rail politics. In 2004, 
downtown Kansas City’s congresswoman, Karen McCarthy, retired. Chastain temporarily moved 
back to Kansas City to run for the seat as a Republican, all the while touting his experience and 
expertise in urban design and Kansas City politics. In media appearances, Chastain expressed a 
burning desire to once again face longtime rival Emanuel Cleaver, the former Kansas City mayor 
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who had easily secured the Democratic nomination in what was at the time Missouri’s second 
most Democratic congressional district (Martin, 2006). Chastain was soundly defeated in the 
primary by Jeanne Patterson, the wife of billionaire Kansas City businessman Neal Patterson, but 
Cleaver would easily win the election in November of 2004. The former mayor, whose three-
word derision of a transit proposal in 1997 had overshadowed light-rail debates almost as much 
as Clay Chastain’s narcissistic rants and back-of-the-envelope designs, had bested Clay Chastain 
once again, likely for the last time. Chastain moved back to Tennessee, and Kansas City 
effectively forgot about light-rail for the next few years. The city’s first quasi-BRT line opened 
during this period and was quickly touted as a transit success among planners and local residents. 
It ran along Main Street, approximately where the Kansas City Streetcar will one day operate, 
and while it was surprisingly successful for KCATA and quickly spawned a second route nearby, 
the city remained politically ambivalent about expanding or revamping transit beyond bus-based 
options in the urban core. 
2006 Initiative 
 The most remarkable moment of Kansas City’s light-rail saga occurred on the night of 
November 7,
, 
2006. That night, as America watched both houses of Congress flip to Democratic 
majorities, and as a prominent former Kansas Citian became the first woman elected to the U.S. 
Senate from Missouri, Kansas City voters approved a light-rail initiative sponsored by Clay 
Chastain, 53%-47% (Horsley, 2006). Three years after the 2003 initiative slipped quietly beneath 
the political waves in Kansas City, Chastain shocked the city by winning approval for a project 
he had touted for nearly a decade. This initiative bore a resemblance to most of his previous 
light-rail plans, with a lengthy yet linear light-rail starter route stretching from KCI to Swope 
Park. A map of the proposed route is illustrated in Figure 4.1. As in years past, Chastain 
proposed extending the existing transportation sales tax, although this initiative also suggested 
shifting existing funds from KCATA’s bus network to help cover costs. He estimated that the 
light-rail portion would cost $900 million. 
 Much of the controversy and media derision surrounding this year’s initiative was the 
provision in the initiative calling for the revamping of Penn Valley Park, which overlooked 
downtown and Union Station from picturesque bluffs (Martin, 2006). Since Kansas Citians and 
most media figures were by now well-versed in Chastain’s brand of light-rail, he spent much of 
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the 2006 campaign focusing on the park provision, which involved rerouting all vehicular 
through-traffic – including the arterial Broadway Boulevard – around the park and installing a set 
of aerial gondolas to ferry visitors up the hillside from Union Station to the Liberty Memorial 
within the park. Penn Valley Park had been designed by George Kessler, and like Union Station 
it was a beloved Kansas City location that had fallen into obvious decay. And, as he had 
attempted with Union Station, Clay Chastain attached the renovation of the park to his broader 
light-rail plan, thus again attempting to ride a wave of nostalgia and civic pride to a victory for 
his otherwise-unpopular transit scheme. The aerial gondolas, which had been mentioned in 
previous initiatives but were made a central element of this year’s plan, were mocked in the print 
media for their Disneyesque whimsy and impractical design as a method of urban transportation 
(Martin, 2006). Still, the light-rail component of his 2006 plan was considerable, as Figure 4.1 
indicates. The light-rail component connected most of the city’s major tourist attractions, as well 
as a terminus at Kansas City International Airport. The proposed route also included connections 
to North Oak Trafficway and Zona Rosa, two major commercial nodes in the city’s northern 
suburbs. Noticeably absent from Chastain’s proposed route were connections to Kansas City’s 
growing eastern suburbs, as well as the low-income Northeast neighborhoods. The Kansas 
suburbs were not included either, though this was likely due to the state boundary preventing a 













Figure 3.1: Map of the 2006 Initiative’s Light-Rail Component 
 
Note: Numbers indicate sequence of stops on northbound route. 
Map created by KCATA, 2007 
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 Leading up to the 2006 election, the city’s major elected officials steered clear of public 
comment on Chastain’s plan, but a few feature articles in the print media managed to expose the 
opinions of local transit advocates (Martin, 2006), and senior city engineers (Campbell, 2006). 
These individuals were openly dismissive of Chastain and his latest plan, and regional transit 
advocate Kite Singleton was more than a little profane in his assessment of the ways in which 
Chastain’s ideas were unworkable and in which they had “poisoned the well” of light-rail 
planning in Kansas City (Martin, 2006). In that same article by Martin, the urban planner 
responsible for managing Kansas City’s then-new BRT system contended that no experts had 
ever been able to work with Chastain, because he was always instantly dismissive of the designs 
of others and always unwilling to let “insiders” slow down his process with technical 
assessments and public input. Deflecting the criticisms of trained engineers and widely-respected 
urban activists was something Chastain had not dealt with in some time, and he seemed eager to 
ignore their arguments and instead focus on his familiar refrain of playing David to the 
establishment’s Goliath. Still, the points raised by those experts are essential to the core 
argument of this thesis: That a rejection of collaboration and public input in the planning process 
leads to an insular project that stakeholders neither recognize nor buy into. Additionally, when a 
proposal relies on gimmicks, nostalgia, or cheap anti-establishment politics, instead of on sound 
planning and design principles, it is likely to be treated with the derision that met almost all of 
Clay Chastain’s grand ideas. But despite these obvious flaws, and despite Clay Chastain having 
the political appeal of a tax on puppies, Chastain’s 2006 initiative passed that November. 
Whether the city was prepared or not, it would now be faced with a lengthy and very public 
discussion of what would happen next. 
 After the unexpected victory, the Council invited Chastain to Kansas City, and made 
public overtures to heal some of the political fracas surrounding the issue and work out the 
specifics of the plan now passed by voters. But Chastain, who was by now living in Virginia and 
remarried to a litigator, threatened legal action if his light-rail plan were excessively altered or 
delayed by this process (Cooper & Helling, 2007). The City Council and the outgoing mayor, 
Kay Barnes, commissioned a feasibility study led by local engineering and planning firm HNTB, 
Inc. The study was projected to take most of 2007 to complete, and in the meantime, a vocal 
group of Kansas City businessmen were circulating a petition to put the 2006 initiative on the 
ballot again, this time to repeal it. Though he wasn’t in the city to contribute to it, Chastain had 
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finally sparked a genuine conversation about light-rail among the major stakeholders in Kansas 
City. City politicians were being forced to “obey the wishes of voters” and support light-rail. 
Most of the city’s major planning and engineering firms were involved in studying Chastain’s 
proposal. Community groups along the alignment (as well as those left out of the plans) were 
speaking out, and the business community was working to get the concept repealed before any 
more tax dollars could be committed to it. All in all, the nine months between the election and 
the presentation of the feasibility study would feature some of Kansas City’s most vibrant 
discussions on the topic of light-rail. As the latter date drew nearer, engineers began expressing 
doubts about the physical feasibility of certain segments of the line, and fiscal analysts 
questioned whether Chastain’s cost estimates were anywhere close to accurate for the project 
(Cooper & Smith, 2007).  
 That August, on a single day, the City Council would hear final reports on both the 
feasibility study and the status of the repeal petition. The day’s events would bring much-needed, 
yet still ultimately pessimistic, structure to the nine-month debate over light-rail. First, the city 
clerk certified the repeal petition, meaning the council would have to either repeal Chastain’s 
ballot initiative legislatively, or else place it on the next scheduled ballot as a plebiscite. This 
served to give the council a firm deadline in their deliberations, or at the very least, a legal way 
to quash the Chastain plan if it proved unworkable. It was on that latter point that the engineering 
report would provide even greater resolution. The report encapsulated much of what urban 
planners had said about Clay Chastain’s plans for years, but it still jarred the political 
establishment assembled to read it that evening. Virtually no segment of Chastain’s rosy 
projections went unscathed. First, and perhaps most importantly, his cost estimates were severely 
off-the-mark. The team estimated the 26-mile route outlined in his plan would cost $1.5 billion 
or more, substantially higher than the $900 million Chastain had estimated before the election 
(Cooper & Helling, 2007). The report further estimated that the line would produce operating 
losses of over $73 million per year by 2034. There were also suggestions that Chastain’s lack of 
public workshops or inclusive design practices might open up the project to lawsuits, or some 
political controversy at the very least. On the technical side, engineers found a litany of major 
flaws in the concept. For example, none of the existing Missouri River crossings in Kansas City 
could support the added weight and infrastructure of light-rail track, meaning the city would 
have to lobby the state and federal governments for an entirely new bridge with approaches. The 
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engineers also found several points along the proposed route where the slope was too steep or the 
ground too soft for light-rail tracks. Given these findings, and the tenacity of those seeking to 
repeal the concept altogether, it quickly became clear that the city would not implement Clay 
Chastain’s voter-backed proposal. While many on the council were quietly relieved at now 
having quantitative justification for rejecting Chastain’s latest idea, the city’s planners were 
openly excited by the publication of so many facts and figures. The general manager of KCATA, 
for example, was pleased that the city’s elected officials finally had a firm grasp on the economic 
and infrastructure costs of light-rail, which he hoped would better inform their own internal 
efforts at planning for light-rail in the future (Cooper & Helling, 2007). Three months after they 
received this damning report, the council voted 10-3 to repeal the plan. Clay Chastain’s decade 
of petitioning had finally resulted in a successful election, but his plan was ultimately undone by 
the numerous and glaring flaws that came about as a result of his consistent failure to work with 
community advocates or engineers, any one of whom likely would have helped him correct some 
of the flaws in his proposal. Therein lies the ultimate undoing of Clay Chastain and of any like-
minded urban activist or politician who works only with an eye on the end result, and not on the 
process by which one gets there. And while he would fight the city’s decision in court for several 
years, Chastain would cease to have a direct impact on light-rail in Kansas City after this point. 
This historical analysis, much like transit planning in Kansas City, continues based solely on the 
actions of professional urban planners in that region. For just as the city council was voting to 
repeal the Chastain initiative, the city and MARC were already well into the planning stages of 
their second attempt at persuading city voters to approve a light-rail system designed and 
promoted by the city’s professional planning staff. Now that the city had a concrete set of figures 
and cost estimates, as well as the public-relations lessons learned after the 2001 failure, planners 
were hopeful that 2008 would bring another voter approval of light-rail, this time of a system 
truly supported by elected officials and eligible for federal endorsement and funding. 
 On a side note, the portion of the 2006 initiative dealing with the restoration of Penn 
Valley Park never got past Chastain’s drawing board. The park, which contained the National 
World War I Memorial, an Interstate right-of-way, and the grounds of two massive and newly-
constructed federal office buildings, was far too entrenched in federal control and regulation for 
the Kansas City Parks and Recreation Department to bother redesigning (Cooper & Helling, 
2007). Chastain’s gondolas were never built, but the added presence of so many government 
37 
 
employees to the park helped to gentrify the area, and Penn Valley Park was revitalized this way. 
And though he would appear in Kansas City and Jefferson City from time to time after this, 
usually in pursuit of a lawsuit against the city’s repeal of his initiative, Clay Chastain has never 
again been seen gathering signatures in Kansas City. After 2007’s repeal vote, it seems Chastain 
finally lived up to his longtime promise, and left Kansas City for good. 
2008 Proposition 
 While the saga of Clay Chastain’s version of light-rail wound down after the 2007 repeal 
vote, the impressions he left on Kansas City voters would last for several more years. His 
coloring of transit policy with identity politics would endure, as would the public skepticism he 
engendered by promoting vague schemes and fuzzy fiscal calculations. These scars on the body 
politic would have to be healed or at least addressed by city planners as they geared up for their 
second formal attempt at a light-rail system for Kansas City. 
 In the midst of the aforementioned study period for the 2006 concept, Kansas City 
elected a new mayor, Mark Funkhouser, who would soon bring his own unique brand of 
personality politics to the city’s transit debate. Before becoming mayor, Funkhouser had long 
served as the city’s auditor, and had made a regional name for himself as a numbers-driven 
policy wonk who also happened to have a healthy dose of personal quirks and egotistical 
tendencies (Janovy, 2007). As city auditor, Funkhouser had witnessed Chastain’s political saga, 
and he made transit reform a part of his mayoral candidacy in 2007. Soon after taking office, yet 
still before the council officially repealed Chastain’s successful initiative, Funkhouser launched a 
multi-county effort to propose a regional transit network. After months of meetings involving 
officials from three Missouri counties, plus planners, residents, and business leaders, 
Funkhouser’s steering committee produced a transit proposal of massive proportions (Spivak, 
2008).  Dwarfing anything previously proposed by Chastain or MARC, this plan featured five 
modes of transit and stops in over a dozen suburbs. The heart of the network was drawn as a 
twelve-mile light-rail route running from south-central Kansas City through downtown and 
across the River into the Northland. Branching off of this would be regional commuter-rail, BRT 
lines, a streetcar for the CBD, and express buses connecting the northern end of the light-rail 
alignment to the airport (Spivak et al., 2008). The mayor’s plan also involved public buy-in from 
people in all three Missouri counties of Kansas City (Jackson, Clay, and Platte), and a city-
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commissioned poll showed a majority of respondents supported the regional-transit concept.  
The main obstacle to the plan was, as with Chastain’s 2006 initiative, the cost structure. 
According to Missouri’s authorizing legislation, transportation sales taxes have a statutory limit 
of fifteen years before they must be reauthorized by voters (Spivak et al., 2008), a time limit 
which would significantly impact the interest rates on the revenue bonds that would be issued to 
finance the transit network. The full network was estimated to cost $1.2 billion, and would be 
funded by a half-cent sales tax in the three affected Missouri counties. The mayor was anxious to 
get this plan before voters in November of 2008, but it was unclear as to whether officials and 
engineers in three counties could organize a unified plan with a final cost estimate in time for 
that election. Fortunately for the mayor, who had by now invested substantial political capital  in 
selling transit, the city had another plan in the works, one that would gain more publicity as it 
became clear that Funkhouser’s three-county network would not be finalized or approved by 
necessary political leaders in time for the 2008 election. 
 This second option was initiated by KCATA, and was initially drawn up as a level-of-
service report explaining the specifics of the twelve-mile light-rail “spine” of Funkhouser’s 
broader plan. As that plan’s backers began to realize that their bold plan was perhaps too 
ambitious and involved to be ready by November, they sought a ballot-ready alternative and 
found that this section had been thoroughly researched and platted by KCATA, and was thus the 
easiest to advertise to voters and federal funding agencies. Since roughly eighty percent of the 
line was in Jackson County, and the remainder entered only a small part of Clay County, 
negotiations among jurisdictions could be simplified. Still, while political wrangling was reduced 
and the plan was simplified, the light-rail portion was still the most expensive mode of the five 
proposed in the mayor’s regional plan. Ultimately, however, the city council settled on this 
alignment, though they added two miles of eastbound track to the southern end as a way to 
mollify community leaders from the East Side (Spivak, 2008). The final cost was estimated at 
$815 million, or $58 million per mile (Smith & Horsley, 2008). The city expected to receive half 
of this funding from the federal government, and the remainder was to be paid by a 3/8-cent sales 
tax increase for 25 years. The city was able to increase the sunset provision from 15 years after 
city attorneys assured them of its constitutionality (Spivak, 2008). The council voted 
unanimously to approve the final plan and cost structure, and the city’s second-ever light-rail 
proposition was set to appear on the ballot on the same day as the 2008 presidential election.  
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 Unlike Chastain’s plans, or even the city’s 2001 proposition, this attempt included 
substantial public outreach and coordination with other municipalities. Mayor Funkhouser 
continued his metro-wide meetings even after the city’s proposal was whittled down from its 
original scope, and the city used social media and YouTube videos to promote the light-rail 
starter line to voters (Spivak, 2008). Opportunities for public buy-in were legion over the course 
of this campaign, and the city remained confident that a transparent process, combined with 
rising gas prices and the recent success of Chastain’s plan, would produce enough favorable 
votes to ensure victory. Yet on election night, the plan was narrowly defeated, 45%-55%.  
 Academic analyses of why the city’s second, and in many ways politically ideal, attempt 
at light-rail failed are in short supply, though Chapter 5 of this document will attempt one such 
analysis. It could be argued that the proposed alignment was too small to have any discernable 
impact on the suburban voters who filled polling places on that landmark election day. Voters 
may also have been turned off by the high cost of the line, nearly $60 million per mile. Or it may 
have been that Kansas City’s voters were simply tired of seeing light-rail on the city’s ballots 
year after year. Whether they were supporters of Clay Chastain, or of the city, or of neither, the 
city’s voting and taxpaying public could likely only tolerate so much controversy and inaction 
before they simply tuned out the conversation. This was likely compounded by the perception 
that most of these plans were designed by city officials and “downtown interests.” Having 
examined the political history of light-rail planning in Kansas City, this project now proceeds to 
the analysis phase. As will be detailed in Chapter 5, these various initiatives and proposals will 
be subjected to two objective analyses, and it is hoped that several driving factors will emerge 
from the process. These factors will conceivably address the specifics of why so many plans 





Chapter 4 - Research Methodology 
When examining the repeated failures of a regional planning project over time, it is 
insufficient to simply chronicle the ways in which past events could have been conducted more 
effectively. In order to have a true policy impact, a thesis such as this must also describe concrete 
solutions to very specific problems. It would be simplistic to blame the failure of transit planning 
in Kansas City on a single politically-toxic stakeholder or a flawed design process. Cities are a 
complex function of a complex species, and answers such as these are insufficient for 
understanding the wide array of social interactions at play. Still, reason dictates that an 
application of the methods and improvements utilized in this project may have a positive impact 
on the process in the future. Furthermore, the survey responses will greatly inform the 
application of the above concepts as they are applied to predicting future outcomes as designers 
and policymakers in the Kansas City region plan for the next phases of mass transit there. 
 In order to properly examine the political standing of public transportation initiatives in 
Kansas City, one must understand both the broader history of the subject within the region, as 
well as survey individual residents and stakeholders to ascertain their preferences and reasons for 
supporting or opposing public transportation proposals as voters and taxpayers. This paper 
studies both the context of transit in Kansas City and its reputation among voters. The first 
portion will be a historical overview and analysis, to be completed independently. The latter 
portion is a survey to be distributed to numerous Kansas City residents in a “snowball format,” 
each participant being asked to share the survey with another citizen. In this study, the unit of 
analysis is the individual Kansas City voter. The unit of measurement, closely related to this, is 
the degree to which these residents believe public outreach should play in the transportation-
planning process. The survey of Kansas City residents gives planners some hard data regarding 
voter preferences for the planning and building of transit systems. Also, by applying the proven 
metrics of Haas and Slotterback, this project offers a quantifiable strategy for improving a 
proposal’s chances of success at the ballot box, giving this project a total of two methods for 
advancing the notion that public participation is an essential aspect of designing effective transit 
networks that move people, improve lives, and pass public muster at the ballot box. 
The study sample consists of two parts. For the historical analysis portion, the sample is 
the history of transit initiatives and plans in Kansas City from 1997-2008. For the survey portion, 
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the sample consists of those Kansas Citians who volunteer to complete the survey. The sampling 
frame is, therefore, Kansas City residents who, for one reason or another, feel compelled to 
express opinions on transit. These participants may be regular riders, or may live or work near a 
proposed route, or they may be suburban motorists who merely dislike funding transit in general. 
While this sampling frame is likely to provide highly insightful responses to the survey 
questions, relying on such a self-motivated subset of residents may limit the study’s 
generalizability. Still, this sample of participants actively interested in transit will provide 
valuable data. The survey was distributed, in both paper and online format, to several 
neighborhood associations in Kansas City’s three Missouri counties.  
While the survey responses are vital to understanding the ways in which residents view 
their role in the planning process, the historical research helps to understand the origins, backers, 
and political context of each transit initiative or proposal within the study period. The application 
of the Slotterback and Haas metrics, explained in Chapter 2, will take place in Chapter 5. The 
survey portion provides essential data on what planning officials in the Kansas City region may 
or may not be doing correctly vis-à-vis their interactions with ordinary voters in the process of 
planning for new and improved transit. Further, the analysis of this original data will inform the 
final plan of action that is presented at the conclusion of this project. 
 The survey was taken either online or in person at a neighborhood meeting. Most of the 
responses are on a Likert scale, with options for residents too new to the area to have any 
firsthand knowledge of the city’s many transit campaigns. The bulk of the questions asked 
participants to evaluate their perceptions of the way Kansas City’s government conducts public 
outreach when planning transit projects. They were also shown Arnstein’s Ladder, and were 
asked to indicate where on the ladder they believed the value of public input currently laid, and 
where it should lie. Participants were asked to rank the comparative importance of timeliness 
versus inclusive design, which will provide sure evidence of the degree to which cities should 
balance public outreach and time/budget constraints if they wish for their project to be approved 
in a city election. 
As mentioned previously, the unit of measurement was the degree to which residents 
believe public outreach should play a part in the transportation-planning process. Asking 
participants to rank the two options listed above – timeliness and inclusiveness – helped to 
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indicate which should be a higher priority for planners and elected officials. The unit of analysis 
was the individual voter. The key variable in the historical-analysis portion was the electoral 
performance of each initiative. The analysis also examined whether community members were 
substantially involved in each initiative in past years, and whether such involvement led to an 
accompanying increase in popular support at the ballot. 
This project’s analytic strategy was twofold. As stated previously, the primary analysis 
was a single-exploratory historical analysis of transit-related ballot actions (initiatives and 
proposals) in Kansas City over the last twenty years. This study examined each action, its 
community and civic backers, and its final performance on the ballot. This analysis provided a 
general framework for the mass-transit climate in Kansas City in a socio-political context, 
against which the secondary analysis was compared. The secondary analysis more directly 
examined individual desires, and took the form of a survey. Triangulation between these two 
methods provided a more complete picture of both angles of the hypothesis: Namely that Kansas 
City voters admire and expect genuine public participation in the planning process, though 
perhaps not as highly as factors such as timeliness or cost, but that a lack of such public input in 
Kansas City’s past had at least some influence on the failure of previous proposals. 
This thesis adds to the understanding of voter preferences in the Kansas City area. 
However, its generalizability to other American cities is limited by the factors that make the 
Kansas City case so unique. Kansas City is a vast, auto-oriented city with a history of 
suburbanization, frequent car use, and skepticism of public transportation. Each of these factors 
plays a role in shaping voter preferences in the region, and these are unlikely to precisely match 
public opinion in other American cities. Still, if it can be demonstrated that voters recognize the 
trade-offs between efficiency and inclusiveness, and that they still stake out expectations along 
the range between the two, then that segment of the study may be applied and replicated 
elsewhere. Kansas Citians and their relationship with public transportation may be unique, but 
the broader concepts of voter buy-in and public participation in the planning process are not. The 
results of this thesis, particularly the documentation of what residents viewed as the most 
important factor in transit design, will thus be somewhat generalizable to the transportation 
planning process in other North American cities. 
43 
 
The mixed-methods approach employed here was vital to understanding the ways in 
which both social and individual forces interact to influence voting patterns on the specific 
subject of transportation. Examining both individual preferences and broader regional sentiments 
helps to tell the whole story. No matter their opinion of it, Kansas Citians have lived with public 
transportation in various modes for nearly a century. However, the notion of involving the public 
in the planning discussion is a relatively new concept. This study helped to introduce this young 
concept to a community that long ago lost faith in transit planning and to document the resulting 
reaction at the individual level. Through this process, it was hoped that the voters of Kansas City, 
and the policymakers who serve at their direction, might have realized new avenues for affecting 
change in their communities and solving the large-scale planning issues that have plagued that 




Chapter 5 – Analysis of Transit Elections 
 As discussed previously, this project analyzes Kansas City’s nine LRT-related elections 
using the metrics established by Slotterback and the Haas research group. The six factors 
identified by Slotterback, and the seventeen identified by Haas’ group, are listed in this chapter. 
Then, each of the nine campaigns is analyzed and scored based on these factors. Virtually all of 
the factors are dichotomous variables, meaning each factor was either present or not present in 
the campaigns. If the factor was present that year, it receives a point, marked “X” on the table. If 
the factor was not present, the space is left blank. The clarity of this method is particularly 
effective for the Slotterback metric, which consists of six “present/not present” factors with 
virtually no room for variation. The Haas metric uses a more vague terminology for many of its 
seventeen variables, and some of them require deeper explanation and analysis. Once each 
metric is applied, and each transit election given a rough score, the data is further examined to 
indicate which factors demonstrate the least and greatest potential for increasing a transit plan’s 
chances of electoral success. In sum, the twenty-three factors utilized here serve to objectively 
determine which procedures and tactics are vital to persuading voters to support a project, as well 
as which factors are irrelevant to the process or incapable of being affected by political actors. 
The success-building tactics that could and should be utilized by political actors are described 
toward the end of this chapter, and make up a substantial part of the suggested plan of action that 
this document will constitute. 
The Slotterback Metric 
 The Slotterback metric, as it appears in the literature, consists of six equally-weighted 
factors that help to determine a project’s viability among voters. All six factors relate to public 
outreach and voter buy-in, and Slotterback argues that a project that fails to maintain these six 
values is likely to fail at the polls. The factors are as follows: The presence of a local (and 
reputable) champion, a mixed-methods approach to gathering and integrating public input, a 
clearly-defined sense of the desired outcome(s), a political establishment willing to stake 
credibility on the proposal, a planning team with significant design expertise, and the use of 
effective visual tools when presenting the proposal to voters. As demonstrated in Table 5.1, these 
six factors allow for a straightforward ranking of the nine campaigns, with the city’s two light-
rail proposals scoring far higher than Clay Chastain’s seven initiatives.  
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Table 5.1: The Slotterback Metric in Kansas City’s Transit Elections  
Campaign Factor 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2006 2008 
 
Presence of a local (and 
reputable) champion 
 
    
    
    
     
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
   X 
Mixed-methods approach to 
gathering public input 
 
                   X                 X 
Clearly-defined sense of 
outcome(s) 
 
   X    X    X   X    X    X    X    X    X 
Political establishment willing to 
stake credibility 
 
                   X                X 
Planning team with significant 
design expertise 
 
                   X                X 
Use of effective visual tools in 
public outreach 
           X        X            X    X 
Total Score    1    1    2    1    5    1    1    2    6 
 The Slotterback metric, according to Table 5.1, indicates a clear bias in favor of the 2001 
and 2008 proposals conducted by the city government. In fact, of the nine campaigns studied, 
only the 2008 light-rail proposal scored a full six points. The 2001 proposal met five of the six 
criteria, but that year’s campaign did not feature the visible support of a local champion or 
political figure. The seven Chastain initiatives scored far lower, largely due to Chastain’s insular 
campaign tactics and poor political reputation among city voters. Each of the six factors warrants 
further explanation, as do the scores of each campaign, and this information is listed below.  
Presence of a local (and reputable) champion 
 The first factor examines, from a political and public-relations standpoint, whether the 
campaign was led by a local and reputable supporter. In Kansas City’s case, local politics is 
generally dominated by the city’s mayor. As Kansas City has a council-manager form of 
government, the mayor is removed from day-to-day administrative tasks and is thus free to 
support and pursue policy directives that impact the entire city. In the case of a transit election, 
the mayor’s support would constitute a tremendous source of political capital, and would add a 
great deal of legitimacy to a proposal. Naturally, the support of the city’s mayor would matter 
most to the 2001 and 2008 city-backed proposals, but the 2001 proposal did not conclusively 
include the vocal support of the city’s then-mayor. While Mayor Kay Barnes was supportive of 
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the proposal in 2001, at least in terms of allowing the city manager to devote the substantial city 
resources required for the project’s design and election campaign, a documentary review of that 
year’s media coverage shows virtually no outspoken comment by the mayor, other than the sort 
of perfunctory support a mayor might give to a municipal sewer-bond proposal. Therefore, if a 
rigorous examination of the city’s 2001 light-rail campaign cannot produce evidence of the 
mayor’s support, then by Slotterback’s logic of voter perceptions, it is unlikely that many voters 
in 2001 were swayed by the mayor’s limited public support of the issue. While Barnes’ 
lukewarm public support likely was not the deciding factor in the 2001 proposal’s defeat, it is 
worth documenting as a political lesson for the city. By contrast, the 2008 proposal was 
prominently led by Mayor Mark Funkhouser, and he personally led many of the negotiations 
with stakeholders and suburban governments.  
 While a city’s mayor is generally the most visible political actor, he or she is by no means 
the sole actor. Civic activists also have the potential to champion large ideas like citywide transit 
plans, and it is not unreasonable to classify Clay Chastain as such a figure. During the timeframe 
in question, Chastain was one of the city’s better-known activists, and had a media profile larger 
than most city councilmembers. However, his seven initiatives fail under this first factor due to 
the question of reputation. While Chastain was visible and well-known, he was not generally 
considered a well-liked or publicly-supported figure in most of the period’s media coverage. 
Further, given the media’s frequent repeating of Chastain’s lack of technical qualifications, it is 
reasonable to infer that Kansas City voters were fully aware that Clay Chastain lacked the 
technical knowledge to design feasible transit networks, as well as the gravitas among elected 
officials to enact his plans legislatively. Thus, while Chastain was a local and fearless champion 
of his initiatives, his campaigns lacked the broad public support vital to an initiative’s success. 
Mixed-methods approach to gathering public input 
 The second Slotterback factor is also simple to measure and interpret. Since Clay 
Chastain’s seven initiatives did not seek formal public input beyond a petition signature, none of 
them are awarded a point on this matter. The city’s two proposals, on the other hand, had well-
documented public input that spanned several established methods. In both cases, the city 
utilized focus groups and public meetings, as well as direct-mail flyers and surveys. Internet-
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based outreach was also used. Slotterback reasons that a mixed-methods approach helps to gain a 
wide range of resident inputs, and the city appears to have made an earnest attempt to do so. 
Clearly-defined sense of outcomes 
 This factor is the sole one in which every campaign receives a point. For many of Clay 
Chastain’s productions, this was the sole point earned. Presenting voters with a simple and well-
explained plan is one of the simpler tasks of a political campaign, and this is demonstrated by the 
apparent ease with which the non-technical Chastain managed to explain his ideas to the city’s 
voters in plain English. An example of this can be seen in the language of the 2006 initiative, 
shown in Appendix A. The city was likewise able to easily explain their concepts and outcomes 
to voters, and media coverage of the campaigns shows few examples of complaints of confusing 
or vague ballot language. While this factor is as vital to achieving electoral success as the other 
five, the fact that every campaign scored equally indicates that supporters of transit in Kansas 
City are not lacking in clarity. 
Political establishment willing to stake credibility 
 This factor is closely related to the first, and refers to whether the city’s elected officials 
and civic boosters are willing to invest their time, money, and political capital on the success of a 
transit campaign. Since Chastain’s seven initiatives were conducted without the support of the 
city’s political leaders, none gained any such devotion from elected officials. The two city 
proposals, on the other hand, received a point each for this factor. Although the 2001 proposal 
suffered from having only the tacit support of the city’s then-mayor, it was still promoted by the 
establishment, and the fact that the council, mayor, and city manager all supported it to some 
degree indicates a willingness to stake their reputations on the campaign that year. As before, the 
2008 campaign featured more visible support from elected officials, and Mayor Funkhouser was 
particularly willing to attach his name and influence to the plan. 
Planning team with significant design expertise 
 This factor is also easily-scored. Since Clay Chastain designed his seven plans himself, 
none of his campaigns received a point here. The city’s proposals, which featured input from 
planners and engineers from city hall, MARC, and KCATA, as well as the work of paid transit 
consultants, were better able to promote their teams’ expertise in the planning of transit systems. 
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By Slotterback’s logic, this factor helps to persuade voters that a plan has been properly designed 
and vetted by experts who know what they are doing. Voters tend to be more supportive of plans 
that are designed by trained experts, and only two of the nine campaigns can claim to have that. 
Use of effective visual tools in public outreach 
 This factor is perhaps the most difficult of the six to define and examine. The question of 
what constitutes “effective” is an evaluation that goes beyond the scope of this project, but this 
factor can still be well-studied without that particular adjective. Even though presenting eye-
catching visuals as part of a transit campaign is one of the simpler aspects of this process, only 
two of Chastain’s seven initiatives appear to have utilized informative visual tools such as maps 
or renderings. While he may have produced such graphics for all seven of his campaigns, only 
two appear in the media’s rather extensive coverage of his many campaigns. In keeping with 
Slotterback’s voters-as-media-consumers logic, it is rational to assume that if Chastain did not 
present visual tools through the mass media of the era, then it is highly unlikely that any such 
tools were able to sway many voters into supporting his concepts. As in other areas, the city’s 
efforts in this regard surpassed Chastain’s. Many of the public outreach methods utilized by the 
city featured clear visuals of the proposed project, including many of the direct-mail pieces and 
the project’s YouTube page.  As technology continues to advance, more and more options for 
presenting visual tools to voters will become available. While the city seems to have mastered 
this concept already, planners should remain mindful of the influence that effective visuals has 
on swaying city voters. 
 Taken together, Slotterback’s six factors represent some direct, if simple, criteria for 
determining a transit campaign’s effectiveness at achieving voter buy-in. While most of these 
factors pertain specifically to conducting public outreach in the design and campaign phases, 
they remain applicable to the overall political strategy of a transit campaign that wishes to 
succeed in a diverse and transit-averse city like Kansas City.  
The Haas Metric 
 The Haas metric was compiled over the course of three major research projects by Haas 
and his team of researchers. The factors number seventeen, and they are by and large more 
specific than the terms laid out by Slotterback. The full listing, and each campaign’s raw score, 
can be seen in Table 5.2 
49 
 
Table 5.2: The Haas Metric in Kansas City’s Transit Elections 
Campaign Factor 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2006 2008 
 
Deliberate P2 during development 
 
   
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
  X 
  
   
 
   
 
   
 
  X 
Existing transit provider with solid 
reputation 
 
  X   X   X   X   X   X   X   X   X 
Wide geographic distribution of 
benefits/routes 
 
        X   X      X   X       
Traffic congestion at a tipping point 
 
                           
Support from local business leaders 
 
                         X 
Support from elected officials 
 
              X            X 
Campaign funds over $1 million 
 
                          
Experience with similar proposals  
 
     X   X   X   X   X     X   X   X 
Vocal support from 
environmentalists 
 
                           
Funding for multiple modes 
 
  X      X   X   X   X   X    X    
Funding for highway/arterial 
improvements 
 
     X   X         X          
Sunset of 20yrs or less, if a 
proposed tax 
 
  X   X   X   X      X   X   X    
Extending an existing network 
 




     X      X      X      X   X 
Experienced campaign consultant 
 
                           
Multimedia advertising 
 
              X         X   X 
Lacked well-funded/prominent 
opposition 
  X   X   X   X   X   X   X   X   X 
Total Score   4   6   7   7   7   8   6   7   8 
 As indicated by the raw scores on the Haas metric, the city’s campaigns again score more 
points than Chastain’s attempts, yet none scored higher than eight out of a possible seventeen. 
There were several factors identified by the Haas metric that no campaign ever featured, and two 
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that every campaign featured. On the whole, the Haas factors are more direct and complex than 
the Slotterback factors, allowing for a more precise, yet still incomplete, evaluation of these nine 
transit elections. As with the Slotterback factors, each will be described below. 
Deliberate Public Participation during Development 
 This factor refers to the degree to which the public’s input is sought during the 
conceptual and design stages of the plan being proposed. As other factors have concluded, the 
city’s substantial public outreach in this regard trumps Chastain’s insular approach. In both of 
their attempts, the city sought public participation through multiple formats and across a wide 
distribution of neighborhoods and interest groups. Beyond gathering signatures, Chastain did not 
actively seek the input of residents, and the city should consider this an object lesson. The city 
should maintain or even expand their efforts at gathering public input, as an inclusive plan is 
generally a more viable one. Still, there remains a notable difference between involving citizens 
in the design process and actually implementing the ideas put forth by citizens. The city should 
be careful not to confuse the two, lest they be accused of ignoring residents’ desires. 
Existing transit provider with solid reputation 
 This is one category that could be considered a “non-factor” in this process, as every 
campaign was affected by this to an equal and unchanging degree. KCATA, which provides 
transit to the metro area, is one of the least controversial organizations in the region, and the 
city’s bus network has a solid reputation for competence and reliability. A transit campaign to 
build or expand light-rail, streetcars, or commuter rail would likely benefit from this reputation, 
but only if it were explicitly connected to KCATA’s existing system. 
Wide geographic distribution of benefits/routes 
 A wide distribution of benefits and routes has the obvious benefit of appealing to the 
widest possible range of voters and potential riders. Four of Chastain’s concepts served a 
geographically-wide area, and none of the city’s final plans did. However, the original 2008 
proposal, before it was pared down, would have easily met this criterion. In a city as 
geographically vast and diverse as Kansas City, designing a plan on a metro-wide scale would 
greatly improve the odds of electoral success, particularly among crucial suburban voters whose 
primary mode of transportation is the automobile. 
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Citywide traffic congestion at a tipping point 
 The general lack of congestion in the Kansas City area prevents this issue from being a 
favorable factor in the campaigns. Haas’ logic is that a city with chronic traffic congestion will 
be more willing to vote for mass-transit expansions. While that has certainly been proven in the 
cities he has studied, it simply would not be a driving factor among voters in Kansas City. This 
factor should be considered, like the agency reputation factor above, to be a “non-factor” here. 
Support from local business leaders 
 The support of local business leaders, particularly a city’s chamber of commerce, can be 
considered one of the single greatest factors in a campaign’s success. According to Haas’ 
research, as well as the specific context of Kansas City’s political environment, the public 
endorsement of a plan by the business community may even hold more sway than local 
politicians, since businesses are perceived as being more concerned with finances than with 
politics (Haas & Estrada, 2011). In Kansas City’s case, only one campaign had such support, in 
2008, and even then it was not well-advertised. The endorsement of the business community 
would broaden a transit campaign’s appeal, but more importantly, it would work to prevent the 
city’s wealthiest interest group from funding an opposition campaign.  
Support from elected officials 
 While the support of elected officials seems like an obvious factor in the furtherance of a 
transit campaign, but the complexities of the citizen-initiative process means this is not always 
the case. As was seen with all seven of Chastain’s initiatives, it is entirely possible for an issue of 
this breadth and expense to make it to a citywide ballot, and it might even win, all without the 
support or approval of the city’s elected officials. Still, silence or outright opposition on the part 
of city politicians can significantly undercut a plan’s credibility. Further, as seen in 2001, even if 
elected officials support a plan, they must be persuaded to sell it publicly if voters are to be 
convinced that the plan has city hall’s endorsement.  
Campaign funds over $1 million 
 This factor presents a valuable criterion, albeit by using a curiously firm dollar amount. 
Haas’ logic behind this factor was that if a transit campaign were capable of raising a million 
dollars in contributions, it would represent not only a political powerhouse capable of easily 
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combatting any opposition through paid media, but also a campaign managed by ambitious and 
productive staff and supported by deep-pocketed residents and businesses. In that sense, the 
dollar amount is merely an indication of a campaign’s ability to compete as a political entity. 
None of the nine campaigns raised a million dollars in contributions, and Chastain’s seven 
functioned with basically no funding beyond word-of-mouth and free media. Given the low 
advertising rates in the Kansas City media market, and the recent boom in free or nearly-free 
social-media marketing, it seems likely that the city could wage an effective and successful 
transit campaign with less than a million dollars. Still, the next campaign should strive to raise 
large donations from start to finish, and its operatives should be mindful of the persuasive power 
of money and notable campaign donations in urban politics.   
Experience with similar proposals in recent past 
 The question of whether the campaign’s backers (or the city’s voters) will have had 
recent experience with similar proposals and elections is a rather moot point in the case of light-
rail in Kansas City. In the last two decades, voters there have had nine opportunities to vote on 
the issue of light-rail and multi-modal transit, and it is unlikely that voters and consultants in the 
region will soon forget their impressions of those past campaigns. A campaign wishing to be 
successful should build on this collective experience, but in a constructive fashion. Since voters’ 
perceptions of the past are not easily changed, a more effective campaign tactic would be to 
persuade voters that the new proposal is an attempt to correct the mistakes of years past. 
Vocal support from environmentalists 
 The support of environmentalists, like that of business leaders, is something that is 
important for a campaign to garner, both for publicity purposes and to placate another powerful 
interest group. A well-designed transit system could potentially take thousands of cars off the 
roads of the metro area, helping to reduce congestion and pollution. This is often a central goal 
of urban environmental groups, and an alliance between such groups and the city’s transit 
campaign is a natural extension of both groups’ political desires. None of the nine campaigns 
sought or received the endorsement of Kansas City’s environmental groups, and this would seem 




Funding for multiple modes of transit 
 The logic behind this factor is much the same as the reasoning behind designing a 
proposal with a wide geographic range of routes and benefits: It broadens the appeal of the 
potential transit system in terms of both areas and populations served. As mentioned in Chapter 
4, the best example of this remains the first draft of Kansas City’s 2008 proposal, which featured 
light-rail, bus rapid transit, streetcar, and commuter rail. Much in the way that inclusive design at 
the conceptual stage can increase perceptions of public input, so too can a multi-modal proposal 
convince a wide variety of voters that the system being proposed would truly have something for 
everyone. For this powerful reason, the city should strive to make its next transit proposal solidly 
multi-modal, even if it means building the system in phases or finding a more complicated 
funding mechanism. The fact that Mayor Funkhouser’s 2008 concept so excited most of the 
elected officials in three counties, even after years of indifference and outright hostility to the 
similar plans of Clay Chastain, indicates the potential power of a multi-modal proposal. 
Funding for highway/arterial improvements 
 Closely tied to the concept of transit plans having a benefit of some sort for every rider is 
the notion that a proposal should include some funding for highway or arterial-roadway 
improvements. Three of Chastain’s productions, and neither of the city’s, included provisions for 
roadway improvements. This was a crucial misstep on the part of campaign strategists, 
considering the number of voters who drive on city roads every day. In most cities, particularly 
Kansas City, transit ridership is well under ten percent of the population (Manzur & Spivak, 
2007b). This suggests that most of the remaining ninety-plus percent use private automobiles as 
their primary mode of transportation. By providing some deliberate support for highway 
improvements, a proposal could win over many of these auto-oriented voters who would not 
otherwise support such a transit-focused ballot issue.  
Sunset of twenty years or less, if a proposed tax 
 This was the sole factor under which all of Clay Chastain’s campaigns received a point 
but neither of the city’s campaigns did. As was noted at length in Chapter 4, Chastain’s plans 
were known for their vague or incomplete financial estimates, and Chastain’s general ignorance 
of municipal finance likely contributed to every one of his proposals featuring a funding 
mechanism with a sunset of less than twenty years. By the city’s more-informed estimates, a 
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multi-modal transit network like the one proposed in early 2008 would cost well over a billion 
dollars. Given this massive cost, and the usual size of a transit sales tax in Kansas City (between 
a quarter-cent and five-eighths of a cent), it would not be feasible for the city to issue revenue 
bonds with a retirement period of under twenty years. While the idea of a system’s bonds not 
being retired for twenty-five or thirty years may seem like a poison pill to a transit campaign, an 
even greater mistake would be shortening this timeframe by increasing the proposed tax increase. 
Given the choice between these two options, and given Kansas City’s historically sound bond 
rating, the easier solution is to stick with the original, if lengthy, sunset period for the proposed 
tax increase. The campaign could soften the political blow by stating that this option would help 
to keep the tax increase as low as possible, but the subject of tax increases versus public debt is a 
touchy issue politically, and the city should avoid a protracted public discussion over the matter. 
Extending an existing network versus starting from scratch 
 More than perhaps any other factor of the Haas metric, this factor is a non-issue for 
Kansas City’s transit planners. In terms of light-rail, commuter rail, and bus rapid transit, Kansas 
City has no existing networks to expand. Unless the transit election in question revolves around 
expanding KCATA’s bus service (the expansion of which has not required voter approval in 
decades), then the campaign would be launching a new transit system from scratch. Because of 
this, Kansas City’s transit elections must essentially forfeit this factor of the Haas metric. The 
only exception to this is the Kansas City Streetcar, which is not a subject of this research project. 
If a transit proposal in the future included funding and plans for an expansion of that system, as 
well as a sizeable component of bus-route expansion, then the campaign would meet this 
criterion. Since the Streetcar is funded through a special-purpose district, and not through 
citywide tax dollars, it is unlikely that it will be easily folded into a citywide transit proposal. 
However, it may be a powerful public-relations asset for campaign organizers, and it may be 
worth it for the campaign to find a way to incorporate the existing Streetcar while still respecting 
the legal and financial obligations of its special-purpose district in the CBD. 
Concurrence with congressional/presidential election 
 Voter turnout is at the heart of a political campaign’s success, and given the broader 
national trend of turnout being highest during national (presidential and congressional) elections, 
it is vitally important that the next campaign time their proposal to appear on the ballot at one of 
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these elections. While five of the nine studied campaigns did end on a congressional or 
presidential election day, the most applicable lesson comes from Mayor Funkhouser’s well-
reasoned rush to get his proposal onto the city ballot in time for the 2008 presidential election. 
National elections, especially ones predicted to be as historic, exciting, and/or close as that 
year’s, bring scores of voters to the polls who otherwise take little interest in municipal elections. 
Funkhouser knew this, and the pressure of time weighed heavily on his proposal’s timeline and 
final design. In addition to the vastly increased turnout during presidential and congressional 
elections, setting a transit election to occur a year or more in advance would give organizers 
more time to conduct public outreach, raise funds, and build a coalition of civic support. Kansas 
City elects its mayor and councilmembers in April of the year preceding presidential election 
years. If the city chose a presidential election date for a transit campaign to appear on the ballot, 
then this would give the political establishment over eighteen months between City Hall’s 
campaign season and the election, plenty of time in which to mount a substantial campaign. 
Experienced consultant leading the campaign 
 According to Haas, the intricacies of explaining municipal finance and tax-increase 
elections to voters are often beyond the skillset of a city’s traditional political actors. Transit 
campaigns tend to be more successful when they hire a leadership team with relevant experience 
in convincing a city’s voters to increase their own taxes to fund transit. In the case of Kansas 
City, none of the nine campaigns were managed by a consultant with this sort of expertise. While 
Chastain may have been passionate about his hand-drawn plans, and Mayor Funkhouser may 
have been skilled at organizing regional consensus, neither was a professional political operative. 
Furthermore, the mayor championed the 2008 proposal while simultaneously serving in his 
official post, making him unable to oversee the campaign full-time. That proposal had two paid 
consultants, but both were fixtures of local mayoral politics and neither had ever overseen an 
election related to either transportation or taxation (Smith & Horsley, 2008). A future campaign 
should hire at least one full-time consultant. It has yet to be tried in Kansas City’s case.  
Multimedia advertising 
 This factor closely resembles one presented by Slotterback, and the rationale behind it is 
identical: Utilizing multiple formats of advertising and outreach allows a campaign to reach the 
widest possible audience. Until recently, political campaigns traditionally relied on direct-mail 
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and television marketing to distribute information. The rise of social media has expanded this to 
include Internet-based marketing and communication. For reasons that were likely financial in 
nature, none of Chastain’s campaigns except for 2006 utilized this multi-pronged media strategy. 
Direct-mail flyers are expensive, and television advertising even more so. His campaigns in 
those years relied on free media and interviews, although he often managed to entice supporters 
to pen lengthy editorials in The Kansas City Star, which can be considered a form of campaign 
marketing. By 2006, however, social media had advanced to the point where Chastain could 
market his latest plan using platforms such as MySpace and YouTube (Martin, 2006), as well as 
his traditional presence in free media and the editorial pages of newspapers. The city’s two 
attempts were better-funded than Chastain’s, and could afford direct-mail and television 
commercials. The 2008 proposal also featured an online presence. Naturally, since an effective 
multi-pronged media presence will help to advertise a plan to a wide variety of voters, a future 
campaign should make this a central goal of its media strategy. 
Lacked well-funded/prominent opposition 
 The final factor proposed by Haas’ group is perhaps the most complicated to interpret and 
explain in the context of Kansas City politics. The original wording of Haas’ criterion alluded to 
a campaign having a better chance of success if its opposition were unorganized, underfunded, or 
otherwise incapable of posing a serious threat. However, measuring political opposition in 
Kansas City, or even documenting it formally, can prove challenging. For example, Chastain’s 
seven initiatives evoked very little formal response from City Hall or the business community. 
Even though actors in both groups were officially and publicly against Chastain’s ideas, and 
openly derided them in interviews, none of the city’s institutional forces organized a formal 
campaign against his many initiatives. The city’s two attempts had a higher political profile, and 
thus attracted more notable opposition, but the handful of suburban-based opposition campaigns 
mentioned in the literature had very little funding and lacked a coherent message beyond 
opposing the specific plan in question. In the case of both Chastain’s and the city’s attempts, 
opposition was wide but largely unorganized and rather anonymous. This is further confirmed by 
the fact that eight of the nine campaigns ended in defeat. Still, it is imperative to understand the 
distinction between political opposition and organized opposition. Virtually everything that is 
done by planners is opposed by one resident or another, but it only becomes a liability when that 
opposition gains prominence and message-discipline equivalent to the city’s campaign.  
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An Ideal Campaign: Kansas City’s 2008 Transit Campaign Redux  
 By all measures used in Chapters 4 and 5, it can be clearly argued that Kansas City’s 
optimal transit plan was the one originally presented by Mayor Funkhouser in early 2008. That 
plan, which featured five modes of transit and the support of a vast coalition of elected officials 
across the region, would have met eleven of Haas’ seventeen criteria had it not been pared down 
in time for the election. A further three could have been met with a more focused campaign 
strategy, leading to a total possible score of fourteen out of seventeen. The remaining three were 
items that were not in the power of a political campaign to change. The improved Haas metric 
can be seen in Table 5.3. The quasi-hypothetical argument presented here suggests that if the city 
were to attempt a campaign similar to the one initially undertaken in 2008, and if they were to 
add a few key factors that were missing that time, then the campaign would be in a far better 
position to be win approval in a future election. 
Table 5.3: Haas Metric for Hypothetical Future Transit Election 
Haas Metric 2008 Final Future Attempt 
Robust P2 during development/planning X X 
Existing transit provider with solid reputation X X 
Wide geographic distribution of benefits/routes   X 
Citywide traffic congestion at a tipping point 
  Support from Chamber/local business leaders X X 
Support from most prominent elected officials X X 
Campaign fundraising near $1 million   X 
Experience with similar proposals in recent past X X 
Vocal support from environmentalists   X 
Funding for multiple modes of transit   X 
Funding for highway/arterial improvements   X 
Sunset of 20yrs or less, if a proposed tax 
Extending existing network (vs. starting new) 
  Concurrence with congressional/presidential election X X 
Experienced consultant leading the campaign   X 
Multimedia advertising X X 
Lacked well-funded/prominent opposition X X 
Total Points (out of 17) 8 14 
Note: Shaded rows indicate components to be added to a future campaign’s overall strategy. 
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 As seen in Table 5.3, six factors have been identified for improvement in the next 
campaign. Three of them were part of the initial 2008 plan before that plan was altered, and the 
remaining three were not attempted in 2008 but should be attempted in the next campaign. The 
original plan had a wide geographic distribution of service, which helped to gain the support of 
leaders across the metro area, and this should be attempted again. That plan also included 
funding for multiple modes of transit, as well as for highway improvements, and both of these 
should be resurrected for the next campaign. The three factors that were overlooked or not 
attempted in 2008 could easily be changed with a more effective campaign leadership team. 
First, large-scale fundraising should be a goal, both to give the campaign some political heft and 
to fund consultants and designers who would help the campaign to appeal to more voters and 
fend off criticism from whatever opposition may arise. Second, the outspoken support of 
environmentalists should be sought and publicized. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the 
city should assemble a team of skilled campaign consultants, one of which should be solely 
devoted to the management of the campaign. While Kansas City may never meet all seventeen of 
Haas’ criteria, the addition of these six should greatly add to the effectiveness of a future 
campaign. At the very least, it would provide the campaign with the resources, endorsements, 
and management expertise to combat the unforeseen challenges that so often accompany 
contentious and expensive issues in urban politics. 
 The analyses and recommendations listed above do not constitute a formula for instant 
success. Every city is unique, and every election is unique. A campaign could conceivably 
follow all of Haas and Slotterback’s factors for success and still be defeated soundly. As has 
been examined in this project, rational plans may be rejected by voters, and irrational plans may 
be approved. The world of urban politics is a world of uncertainty and unknown variables, which 
is one reason why many scientifically-trained urban planners misunderstand or even avoid the 
subject when making plans. But to avoid the issue, and the root causes underlying it, is to do a 
disservice to the public trust. The building and operation of cities is an inherently political task, 
and planners must recognize the public’s varied perceptions and learn to work productively with 
them. As will be examined in Chapter 6, the deeply-rooted perceptions of individual residents are 
not always what they seem, though they may account for much of why transit elections in 




Chapter 6 – Survey Results 
“People don’t want to be informed. They want to feel informed.” 
– Chet Collier, co-founder of Fox News 
 The citizen survey was conducted over a seven-week period in December of 2013 and 
January of 2014. Participants were asked a total of ten questions designed to assess their views 
on transit planning and the public’s role in it. A copy of the survey can be seen as Appendix B. 
The survey was conducted through an online survey program, and it was submitted to a total of 
nine neighborhood/homeowner’s associations in Kansas City proper. Each association agreed to 
distribute the survey’s web address to their members, and participants were encouraged to pass 
along the survey to friends and relatives who also lived in Kansas City. The survey was 
anonymous, and did not record the respondent’s name, neighborhood, or IP address. Over the 
seven-week period, a total of eighty-seven responses were recorded. As mentioned previously, 
one major perception measured by the survey was the participant’s opinion of where on 
Arnstein’s Ladder they felt the current transit-planning process fell, as well as where on the 
ladder they felt it ideally should be. The responses to this pair of questions were mostly in line 
with what was expected, given the city’s record of public engagement as measured in Chapter 3. 
Another vital interaction examined by the survey was the respondents’ perception of the relative 
importance of planners’ adherence to a project schedule versus the importance of gathering 
robust public input (which would conceivably extend the project timeline). The value of these 
two issues was measured separately as well as against one another, so as to ascertain from 
participants which goal they perceived to be more important to the planning process. On the 
whole, the survey responses gathered indicate several key perceptions and opinions about the 
process that planners in Kansas City would be wise to address before making another attempt at 
a citywide transit election. 
 The first two questions of the survey asked about Arnstein’s Ladder and residents’ 
perceptions of their role in the planning process. The measurable difference between what 
respondents perceived as their position in the existing process versus the level at which they 





 Figure 6.1: Comparison of Existing versus Desired Places on Arnstein’s Ladder 
 
 As can be seen in Figure 6.1, there is a stark contrast between where respondents place 
the existing public-outreach process and where they desire the process to be. A solid majority of 
respondents ranked the existing public-outreach process as somewhere between steps three and 
five (informing, consultation, and placation). No respondent ranked the current system higher 
than partnership (step six). For the second question, which asked about the desired level of 
public involvement, the responses were far closer to unanimous. 85% of respondents stated that 
they would prefer the process be at step six. The remaining fifteen percent stated a desire for 
delegated power (step seven) and citizen control (step eight). One outlier stated a preference for 
therapy (step two). The perception of the current relationship being less than equal generally 
correlates with historical patterns in Kansas City as examined in Chapter 3. Given that seven out 
of the nine transit elections were led by a citizen-activist who did not actively seek public 
involvement, it follows that Kansas Citians might not see themselves as having played an active 
role in the planning of transit in their city. It should be noted here that these two survey questions 
asked respondents to rate their perceptions of where on the ladder the city-citizen interaction 
was, not the interaction between Clay Chastain and citizens. While the city government and Clay 
Chastain were clearly never the same entity, Chastain’s style of promoting plans without any 
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public input has no doubt colored the views of many citizens who may have come to equate 
Chastain’s style and plans with those of the city government. At any rate, the question carries 
equal validity regardless of the party with whom citizens are interacting during the planning 
process. The responses to question one clearly show that Kansas City residents feel the planning 
process is not as balanced as it should be. This deficit must be remedied by planning officials if 
they hope to gain faithful citizen buy-in in the future. 
 One particular result from question two that deserves thoughtful evaluation is the clear 
minority of responses calling for the process to be located at delegated power (step seven) and 
citizen control (step eight). Despite residents’ clear assertion that the existing process is not open 
enough to citizen input, few seem eager for citizens to take direct control of the process. This 
indicates a clear desire for citizens to work in concert with trained planners, and also that they 
continue to place at least some faith in the expertise of planners and engineers. The fact that 
eighty-five percent of residents surveyed believe the process should be at step six, which was 
incidentally the optimal level preferred by Arnstein herself (1969), shows that planners and 
policymakers in Kansas City need not fear losing the authority to make planning decisions. If the 
survey data are any indication, then citizens have almost no interest in taking charge of the 
process. 
 The third question on the survey examined respondents’ perception of how seriously the 
city government takes their concerns about transit. Twenty-nine percent of respondents agreed 
that the city takes their ideas and concerns about transit seriously, while precisely double that 
number, fifty-eight percent, disagreed. The fact that twice as many residents feel ignored as feel 
influential is indicative of a trust deficit on the part of KCATA and city transit officials, or at 
least a very strong perception of one. The reasons why residents might feel as though the city’s 
transit authorities do not take their concerns seriously are numerous and varied, and most are not 
examined as a part of this project, but the responses to this question nonetheless indicate that 
respondents feel they do not have the attention of KCATA. A trust deficit such as this must be 
addressed if the city and KCATA hope to expand and improve transit operations in the region. 
Not only will it improve a transit proposal’s chances of passage in a future election, it will also 
greatly contribute to the improvement of relations between planners and the people who use and 
pay for transit. 
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 Question four of the survey polled respondents on whether Kansas City residents would 
vote to approve a light-rail proposal if the public were involved in planning the route. In total, 
three-quarters of the participants expressed belief that voters would approve such a proposal, 
thus indicating that the public seems to place political value in the concept of citizen 
involvement in the planning of transit. While this concept has been heavily examined and 
promoted within the literature and within this project, its limitations must be understood 
alongside the survey results. First, the survey question used general terminology rather than a 
specific example of a transit plan, thus inviting participants to think and respond in the abstract. 
As has been examined over the course of this project, there exists a distinction between public 
support of abstract ideas and public support of specific plans as they appear on the ballot. Pre-
election polls may indicate a fervent support for transit, particularly transit designed with the 
input of residents, but that does not necessarily mean that voters will approve a given transit 
measure. Still, question four provides what may be among this project’s most invaluable 
insights: Voters may be more willing to support a transit proposal if they feel their voices have 
been heard. As the quote at the start of this chapter suggests, there is a definite distinction 
between residents being informed and residents feeling informed. If planners and elected 
officials in Kansas City wish to move beyond selling transit to the voters, and to truly win the 
broad base of support needed for their future plans, then they must make a greater effort to 
establish those emotional linkages between residents and the plans on which they are voting. The 
results of question four show that voters have the capacity for such connections, and would be 
swayed in favor of passage based on them. City planners need only foster the growth of 
emotional-political connections by implementing reforms that not only include residents in the 
planning process, but that also make them feel as if they truly are a part of it. 
 In keeping with the stated research question regarding whether timeliness or openness is 
of more importance to voters, the next three questions focused on the importance of the two 
variables independently, as well as against one another. 
 Question five asked respondents to rate the comparative importance of expert versus non-
expert contributions, and the results closely mirrored those of the first two questions. Over eighty 
percent of respondents felt that the best way to design an effective and popular transit system 
was with a balance of expert (planner) and non-expert (resident) inputs. The strength of the 
majority responding in this manner further validates the first two questions, and indicates that 
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residents strongly favor a balanced approach to gathering input and suggestions in the plan-
making process. However, as was indicated by subsequent responses, other factors may 
influence the relative strength of this belief. 
 Question six questioned how much time planners should ideally devote to gathering 
public input during the planning of a transit proposal. By a similar majority of seventy-seven 
percent, respondents felt that planners should find a balance between the time-intensive 
gathering of public input and the adherence to a set schedule. As with question five, the fact that 
over three-quarters of respondents desired a balanced approach to gathering public input shows 
that citizens realize the limitations of a planning process overburdened by the gathering of input 
from an infinitely-diverse populace. 
 Question seven asked respondents to decide whether it was more important for a transit 
proposal to meet the demands of the public or for it to be completed on-schedule. By a two-to-
one margin, respondents said timeliness was more important than the gathering of substantial 
public input. A graphic illustrating this margin may be seen in Figure 6.2.  
Figure 6.2: The Comparative Importance of Scheduling versus Public Input 
 
 While it is informative and imperative to gauge the importance of each issue separately, 
the placement of the two variables in direct competition yielded some insightful results. On the 








"Which Factor is More Important when 
Designing a Transit System?" 
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first two questions. The results of all five questions, taken together, indicate that while public 
involvement is seen as vital to the process, respondents feel it is much more important for a 
project to be completed on schedule than to seek a degree of public involvement that might delay 
the process. While respondents expressed a strong desire for public input to be on equal footing 
with the expertise of planners, they place a higher value on the timely completion of transit 
infrastructure. 
 The next pair of questions focused on credibility in the planning process, and both were 
designed to ascertain which actors had the public’s confidence. Question eight asked respondents 
to select which actors were most qualified to design transit. Respondents were allowed to select 
multiple options for this question, and they gave roughly equal weight to private-sector planners, 
public-sector planners, citizen groups, and frequent riders of transit. While all four were closely-
ranked, the two “expert” options received slightly more votes than the “non-expert” options. This 
distinction, while slight, seems to confirm earlier responses showing that residents trust the 
expertise of planners and engineers, even though they ultimately desire a process in which non-
experts play a role as well. 
 Question nine posed a similar question, but with more specific actors mentioned. 
Participants were asked whether Clay Chastain or the city’s planners, or both or neither, had 
been more effective at designing transit options for Kansas City. More than half of respondents 
believed neither had been effective. The city’s planning staff received three times as many votes 
as Clay Chastain, who scored the lowest out of the four options. This disparity shows that, at 
least comparatively, Kansas City residents appear to hold their city government in a slightly 
higher regard than the city’s most prominent transit activist. And while a majority of respondents 
believed that neither the city nor Chastain has designed effective plans in the past, the fact that 
the city received three times as many votes as Chastain indicates that residents have not entirely 
lost faith in the city’s ability to plan effective transit. The responses to this question confirm the 
historical and electoral analyses conducted earlier in this project, namely that there has been 
scant public support for the light-rail proposals of the past. Predicting future electoral success 
based on this raw data would be difficult, but it is safe to conclude that a proposal put forth by 
the city would be better-accepted by the public than another attempt by Clay Chastain. 
 The final question of the survey asked respondents to rank how seriously they believed 
transit planners should take the views and opinions of ordinary citizens. Over two-thirds 
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responded that planners should take these views either “seriously” or “very seriously.” This 
question was selected based on the way it gave greater detail to understanding the degree to 
which citizens believe they should be involved in the process. Of the two-thirds mentioned 
above, nearly five times as many chose “seriously” than chose “very seriously.” Some of this 
may be attributable to the wording of the choices. For example, the “very seriously” option 
specified that all citizen viewpoints should be treated equally, while the “seriously” option 
specified that some viewpoints are more realistic or feasible than others. Still, even if it were 
partially attributable to the phrasing of the choices, the overwhelming popularity of the 
“seriously” option shows that respondents are willing to make the distinction between workable 
and unworkable ideas from the general public. This response, coupled with the rest of the survey 
as a whole, indicates that residents not only want more involvement, they want it to be more 
effective and useful involvement.  
Applicability to Literature 
 The results of the survey largely fit the findings of the existing literature, with some 
correlating directly. For example, the finding that respondents trust in the expertise of planners 
and technicians is in direct agreement with the findings of Grossardt, et al (2010). The series of 
papers by Grossardt, Bailey, and their associates (2003, 2010, and 2011) are also vindicated by 
the findings of this survey. While those projects utilized their method of “Structured Public 
Involvement,” and this project did not, their assertion that a planning process that deliberately 
incorporates the inputs of ordinary citizens will enrich the process and lead to more politically-
acceptable outcomes is validated by the responses to this survey. Respondents strongly agreed 
that voters would be more likely to approve a transit proposal if the public were involved in 
planning it. The findings related to Arnstein’s Ladder also mirror that author’s original findings 
from the 1960s, namely that non-expert citizens generally wish to gain a position of equal 
authority with policymakers, but do not wish to control the process entirely. The Grossardt and 
Bailey papers touched on the issue of policymakers ceding some control over the process, and 
Denhardt and Denhardt mentioned it as a key component of their “Seven Principles of New 
Public Service” (2000). Planners and policymakers may be reluctant to give up portions of their 
hard-fought influence in the process, and this may account for some of the shortcomings of 
existing public-outreach processes. However, if the results of this survey are any indication, it is 
evident that the general public respects and values the training of planners, and has no interest in 
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seizing a large piece of the decision-making process. Existing literature on the subject has 
generally argued, and this survey has confirmed, that the public sees the planning processes of 
the past to have been exclusive and undemocratic. And while their desired position would hold 
far more influence than in decades past, it is on the whole a balanced and open dialogue that 
residents desire. Kansas City’s planners and elected officials must adjust the process to provide 
this level of partnership, and they must also adjust their thinking to no longer see the process as a 
zero-sum struggle for political influence and power. 
Policy Implications of the Survey Findings 
 Given that the central conclusion of the transit survey was that residents strongly desire a 
more equitable role in the transportation planning process, a logical administrative adjustment 
would be to enact policies that strengthen the public’s role in that process. While public 
participation has been mandated in federally-funded projects for decades, and Kansas City’s 
planning department has been incorporating public input since the earliest days of light-rail as a 
transit option there, it would resonate politically if the city council enacted fresh legislation more 
explicitly detailing the role of the public in the process. By making a public commitment to 
working in partnership with ordinary citizens, and by showing residents that they truly are a 
legitimate and fully-empowered part of the process, the city government would make a great 
stride toward closing the Arnstein Gap shown in this survey’s responses.  
 In addition to closing the Arnstein Gap among Kansas City voters, such a public 
commitment to partnerships in planning would be helpful in fostering public support for a 
citywide transit proposal the next time the city wishes to submit one to voters. As was 
documented in the survey, respondents equate political legitimacy with a process in which 
citizens are a part. If the city’s next transit proposal has such an open process in place, the 
legitimacy gained will likely sway enough city voters to ensure passage of the proposal. Given 
that residents are mindful of project timelines and public budgets, the policy changes suggested 
above should include explicit language ensuring that the enhancements to the public-outreach 
process shall not substantially impact either construction schedules or capital outlays. While the 
survey documented evidence that residents do not like an insular process, it also showed that 
they like delays and added expenses even less. Thus, the challenge for planners and city officials 
will be to substantially raise the profile of public participants in the planning process while at the 
same time not permitting the process to be delayed or halted entirely by excessively numerous 
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public meetings. The surest way to accomplish such a balance will be to focus less on increasing 
the number of public meetings and more on increasing the quality of each meeting. If city 
planners can make every meeting a productive contribution to the proposal, and if they can make 
every participant at each meeting feel as though they are valued in the process, then they will 
produce a more effective and better-regarded proposal to place before voters. At the same time, 
if city leaders can enact visible and substantive reforms to the way the city interacts with the 
public, and if they can show the voting public that neither their opinions nor their tax dollars are 
being wasted on a boondoggle-on-wheels, then they will help to ensure voter passage of 





Chapter 7 – Discussion 
 As this project drew to a close, several findings of fact emerged that have informed and 
explained, but have never conclusively defined, the complexities of planning cities in a 
democratic society. The research questions explored through this project have been addressed, 
but in the face of their resolution shall continue to emerge fresh questions about the extent to 
which planners and ordinary citizens can and should interact. The matter will never be entirely 
settled, the battery of mysteries never fully solved. But such is the nature of the study of human 
society. Still, this project has contributed some substantive findings regarding the latest iteration 
of the planner-citizen relationship. It is a study of a contemporary issue of urban planning and 
municipal governance, and was completed with the skills and acumen commensurate with a 
master’s candidate in Regional and Community Planning. While very little of social-science 
research is wholly conclusive, researchers must endeavor to find patterns, to explain phenomena, 
and to seek the most conclusive and productive solutions their training and data can help them to 
imagine. This final chapter is a reflection on the solutions presented in this document, and the 
ways in which future research may be able to proceed subsequent to this document’s publication. 
Policy Recommendations 
 While abstract questions and suppositions remain at the conclusion of a project such as 
this, several tangible findings have also been produced that will aid in the better understanding of 
Kansas City’s transit saga. This project provided raw data on how voter perceptions of a transit 
proposal can influence voter preferences on that issue.  
 On the whole, the survey responses indicated a trust deficit between voters and planners, 
but also showed that residents continue to place great trust in the expertise of professional 
planners and engineers who design transit. In future transit campaigns, the city should pay close 
attention to voters’ perceptions of trust, and strive to portray the proposal under consideration as 
something that is both designed by qualified experts and supported by a wide array of citizen 
groups. By building on the existing trust voters have for technical experts, and by salving some 
of the public’s distrust of a politicized process, campaign leaders can more effectively persuade 
voters that the proposal under consideration is rational, sensible, and above-board. 
 Building on the issue of trust, and due in no small part to the survey findings indicating 
massive support for a partnership-level collaboration between planners and the public, transit 
planners should strive to incorporate genuine public input into the planning and design process. 
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Planners must be willing to make changes to the plan, provided members of the public can state a 
convincing alternative. Said changes must be prominently advertised in campaign materials and 
in the media, so as to show the broadest possible audience that the process is indeed open to 
suggestions and improvements from ordinary residents. 
 In terms of public meetings and structured public outreach efforts, Kansas City’s planners 
should avoid the trap of simply scheduling more meetings at more times and locations, and 
instead focus on taking steps that would produce a higher quality of participation at every 
meeting. Building on the notion that one productive meeting that can result in substantial 
dialogue is more effective than ten mere “information sessions,” planners must reorient their 
public-outreach efforts away from simply informing the public to a more open-ended stance that 
encourages public input and a genuine dialogue between political equals. If residents feel 
empowered by the process, and feel as though they have a personal stake in the system being 
planned, then they are much more likely to be engaged during the planning process and likely 
vote in favor of the project on election day. 
 Given the enormous political pressures involved in the federal grants process, as well as 
the even greater pressures related to a citywide transit election, it is vitally important that 
planners and stakeholders lay out a sequence of events prior to initiating the funding process. 
One lesson learned from Chastain’s 2006 initiative was that, even when the answer is no, the best 
way to get the formal attention of federal funding authorities is to present a thoroughly-planned 
concept as a packaged item, complete with cost estimates and the backing of the city’s voters and 
political establishment. The next time Kansas City attempts a transit proposal, planners would be 
wise to design and finalize a concept before launching the drive for funds. Such a method would 
have the added electoral benefit of showing city voters a clear and complete picture of what they 
are voting on and how much it will cost. 
 As illustrated in Chapter 5, leaders of a future transit campaign should expand their 
outreach efforts to build a broader coalition of local supporters, as well as expand the proposal to 
include transportation improvements for a wider variety of modes and geographic areas. The role 
of campaign strategy is vital to the success or failure of a citywide transit election, and the 
improvements outlined in Chapter 5 would greatly enhance a campaign’s effectiveness at 
swaying city voters in favor of a transit proposal. 
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 While these recommendations will improve the likelihood of a campaign’s success, there 
are few guarantees in urban planning. A flawless campaign could still result in electoral defeat, 
while a deeply flawed campaign and proposal could win a citywide vote. Still, as public servants, 
planners and a city’s elected officials must always strive to present the public with the best 
possible options and the most reasonable guidance they can provide. What the voters do with 
their newfound power and information is up to them.  
Suggestions for Future Research 
 While the fluid complexities of human society make social-science research an ever-
changing field, it also provides researchers with a seemingly endless supply of new questions to 
ask and new theories to test. This project touched on several aspects of the issue at hand, but 
others remain ripe for study. For example, the Kansas City Streetcar, which was mentioned at the 
start of this document and is under construction as of the publication of this document, presents 
an opportunity for both researchers and Kansas City’s planning professionals to study the 
concepts and conclusions presented by this project as a transit system is being built. The city is 
planning significant expansion of the system, and future research should be directed there, so as 
to ascertain whether Kansas City’s administrative bodies have made any notable progress in 
further healing the public-relations wounds left over from the era of Chastain and light-rail.  
 The concept of social media as a tool for participatory planning was touched upon in 
Chapter 2, and research into this growing phenomenon has only begun to enter maturity as of 
2014. Nonetheless, it is likely to continue to grow in importance, and future research should 
examine this as applied to Kansas City and other cities. More directly related to this project’s 
findings, however, is the question of whether this new form of public outreach is an effective 
way to bridge the Arnstein Gap that exists in places like Kansas City. Social media outlets have 
already proven their ability to connect individuals and demographics not traditionally associated 
with political activism. The ways in which cities might use social media tools to bring residents, 
particularly those non-traditional political participants, into the planning process are bound to 
grow in number and complexity over the next few years. This too is an area that would benefit 
from further study. 
 A third option for future study of these issues lies in another major motivator of 
American voters, an option that was not researched extensively by this project: The role of 
money in the public’s voting behavior. While this research found a solid and conclusive nexus 
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between voters’ emotions and perceptions, and the ways in which those feelings influenced 
voting choices, an equally serious effort could be made to study the financial considerations of 
the voters who voted for and against the light-rail concepts proposed in Kansas City over that 
span of time. Financial considerations have long been cited as a major factor in public opinion 
polls and voter behavior, and it stands to reason that such theories could be applied to the same 
political environment that was researched from this project’s angle of voter perception. 
Analysis of Alternatives 
 This research project was completed within its desired timeline, and used a wealth of data 
and analysis to suitably answer the research questions posed. However, some methods and 
outcomes could have performed differently, and they must be addressed as a part of this project’s 
conclusion. The most prominent outcome that could have been more substantive is the sample 
size of the transit survey. Over four hundred thousand people live in Kansas City, Missouri, and 
the survey’s sample was eighty-seven responses. While this number was sufficient to draw some 
useful conclusions for the purposes of this project, a much larger sample population and a longer 
time period for collection would have been beneficial to the project.  
 Another technique which may have resulted in a greater response rate, and likely some 
even stronger participant opinions, would have been to conduct the survey in person at one of the 
very same public-outreach occasions studied by this project. Surveying residents when the 
planner-citizen interaction was fresh on their minds could have provided some more insightful 
data than an online survey. In fact, this project’s original survey strategy involved doing this very 
technique, and would have measured a very different angle of the planner-citizen interaction. 
This original research plan, and the reasons why the project had to change course, are discussed 
in greater detail in the postscript at the end of this document.  
 This project was undertaken as an attempt to understand a vital relationship within the 
field of urban planning, a relationship that more than any other factor controls the way in which 
cities are built and expanded. A better understanding of the working relationship between 
technically-trained planners and the urban residents they serve is vital to the growth of the field. 
The issue, and this project, was prominent enough to merit the awarding of an Eisenhower 
Transportation Fellowship, indicating that planners and policymakers in the United States desire 
to understand and further the research in this project. This project also represents an attempt by 
the author to understand a very prominent issue in his hometown of Kansas City, Missouri. This 
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project has been a study of perceptions. Whether it was examining the ways in which one die-
hard activist defined light-rail in his own vision, how residents saw their role in the planning 
process and desired more, or even simply how one planning student saw an unsolved mystery in 
his hometown and sought an answer, this project represents an examination of the ways in which 
urban planning can inform human thoughts, and how those thoughts can in turn inform the ways 
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Appendix A – Chastain’s Successful 2006 Initiative 
 
The following appeared as Question 2 on the Kansas City, Missouri general election ballot on 
November 7, 2006. The initiative passed, 53% to 47%. 
 
QUESTION 2: SHALL THE FOLLOWING BE APPROVED? 
 
In order to provide for the people of Kansas City a pioneering urban rail passenger system, 
constituting the foundation of a future regional transit system, offering not only increased 
energy-efficiency, comfort, mobility, transportation savings, and convenience, but also a greener, 
cleaner, safer environment, a stronger economy, and a means to help America reduce its 
dependence on imported oil; shall the City of Kansas City, Missouri extend the current three-
eighths (3/8) cent transportation sales tax, due to expire on March 31, 2009, for 25 years, 
beginning April 1, 2009 and ending March 31, 2034, with said tax to be used solely to fund the 
construction, operation, maintenance, and beautification of the following transportation 
improvements under the auspices of the Kansas City, Missouri City Council: 
 
1. Implement Kansas City’s new Heartland Light Rail System consisting of a north/south light 
rail spine beginning at the Kansas City Zoo in Swope Park and ending at Kansas City 
International Airport including, but not limited to, stops at UMKC, Nelson Art Gallery, Plaza, 
Westport, Union Station, Performing Arts Center, Convention Center, Power & Light District, 
Sprint Center, City Market area, North Kansas City, North Oak Trafficway, and Zona Rosa; with 
the route following 63rd Street, Troost Avenue, 50th Street, Rockhill Road, Emanuel Cleaver 
Boulevard, Mill Creek Park, Broadway Boulevard, along the high ridge in Penn Valley Park to 
the junction of Kessler Road and Pershing Road, the west side of Union Station’s Carriage 
House, Broadway Boulevard, 13th Street, Oak Street, Heart of America Bridge, Burlington 
Avenue, N. Oak Trafficway, Englewood Road, Waukomis Drive, the interurban right-of-way, 
Barry Road, Amity Avenue, and concluding at a transit hub, park & ride lot, and shuttle station 
near Madrid Avenue at KCI; also including new ground level power supply technology (no 
overhead wires), and park & ride lots; 
 
2. Implement a green fleet of sixty electric shuttles to provide connecting transit service to all 
light rail stops making possible the expansion of the light rail system’s service area to nearby job 
centers, neighborhoods, and other primary destinations not directly served by the rail line; 
 
3. Implement an aerial gondola tram system providing passenger service between Union Station, 
Liberty Memorial, and Penn Valley Park; remove all thru vehicular roads, including Broadway, 
in the park and re-route traffic around the park; replace roads with landscaped transportation 
corridors for new bicycle & walking pathways, the gondola, and a wooden light rail truss bridge; 
with the funds also to be used to retire bond indebtedness related to the projects, and to help 





Appendix B – Text of Citizen Survey 
The following is the precise text of the survey submitted to Kansas City residents. 
 
Kansas City Transit and Public Involvement Survey 
 
1. When it comes to the way transit is planned in Kansas City, at which step would you place the 
decision-making process? Please read all definitions before choosing one. 
(1) Manipulation – Government initiates change and controls the decision-making process entirely 
(2) Therapy – Citizens are only indirectly involved, and are not informed of all options/outcomes 
(3) Informing – Citizens are informed of the process, but their views are not sought 
(4) Consultation – Citizens are informed and their opinions sought, but their advice is largely ignored 
(5) Placation – Citizens contribute their opinions to the process, but only token changes are made 
(6) Partnership – Citizens are consulted, and the result is a negotiation between them and government 
(7) Delegated Power – Citizens control most of the process, and delegate some tasks to city staff 
(8) Citizen Control – Citizens initiate change and control the decision-making process entirely 
 
2. At which step do you think the process should be? Please read all definitions before choosing one. 
(1) Manipulation – Government initiates change and controls the decision-making process entirely 
(2) Therapy – Citizens are only indirectly involved, and are not informed of all options/outcomes 
(3) Informing – Citizens are informed of the process, but their views are not sought 
(4) Consultation – Citizens are informed and their opinions sought, but their advice is largely ignored 
(5) Placation – Citizens contribute their opinions to the process, but only token changes are made 
(6) Partnership – Citizens are consulted, and the result is a negotiation between them and government 
(7) Delegated Power – Citizens control most of the process, and delegate some tasks to city staff 
(8) Citizen Control – Citizens initiate change and control the decision-making process entirely 
 
3. Please rate the following statement: “The city takes my ideas and concerns about transit seriously.” 
(_) Strongly Agree 
(_) Agree 
(_) Not Sure 
(_) Disagree 
(_) Strongly Disagree 
 
4. Please rate the following statement: “Voters would approve a light-rail plan if the public were 
involved in planning the route.” 
(_) Strongly Agree 
(_) Agree 
(_) Not Sure 
(_) Disagree 
(_) Strongly Disagree 
 
5. In your opinion, what is the best way for a city to design effective and popular transit? 
(_) Designed by experts, with little public input 
(_) Designed to meet each citizen’s transit needs 





6. In your opinion, how much time should planners devote to seeking the public’s input? 
(_) Planners should seek only the legally-required public input, so the project may be completed on time 
(_) Planners should seek as many opinions as possible, even if it adds months to the project timeline 
(_) Planners should balance public input with an established timeline for completion 
 
7. Ultimately, which of these factors is most important when designing/building a transit system? 
(_) Being designed to meet the needs of as many citizens as possible 
(_) Being completed on schedule 
(_) Other (please specify) 
 
8. In your opinion, who is qualified to design effective transit for Kansas City? (Select all that apply) 
(_) Engineers and planners from local government 
(_) Citizen-activists and neighborhood groups 
(_) Engineers and planners from the private sector 
(_) People who frequently ride transit 
(_) Other (please specify) 
 
9. In your opinion, who has been better at designing effective transit ideas for Kansas City?  
(_) Kansas City planners and elected officials 
(_) Clay Chastain (who initiated several light-rail proposals from 1997-2006) 
(_) Both have been equally effective 
(_) Neither has been effective 
 
10. In your opinion, how seriously should transit planners take the opinions and concerns of citizens? 
(_) Very seriously. Every citizen’s viewpoint matters equally. 
(_) Seriously. Some viewpoints and ideas are more realistic than others. 
(_) Not too seriously. Transit planning is more complicated than many citizens understand. 




Appendix C – Documentation of Survey Responses 




  Manipulation 4 5% 
Therapy 5 6% 
Informing 20 23% 
Consultation 26 30% 
Placation 24 28% 
Partnership 8 9% 
Delegated Power 0 0% 
Citizen Control 0 0% 
  87   
Question Two: 
  Manipulation 0 0% 
Therapy 1 1% 
Informing 0 0% 
Consultation 0 0% 
Placation 2 2% 
Partnership 74 85% 
Delegated Power 6 7% 
Citizen Control 4 5% 
  87   
Question Three: 
  Strongly Agree 4 5% 
Agree 21 24% 
Not Sure 11 13% 
Disagree 30 34% 
Strongly Disagree 21 24% 
  87   
Question Four: 
  Strongly Agree 21 24% 
Agree 44 51% 
Not Sure 14 16% 
Disagree 8 9% 
Strongly Disagree 0 0% 
  87   
Question Five: 
  Designed by experts 6 7% 
Designed for citizens 8 10% 
Balance of both 70 83% 
  84   
83 
 
   




Only min. required 7 8% 
As much as possible 12 14% 
Balance of both 65 77% 
  84   
Question Seven: 
  Meet public demands 22 27% 
Finish on schedule 56 67% 
Other 5 6% 
 
83 
 Other Responses: 
  "Designed to secure federal/local funds" 
"Future adaptability and cost-effectiveness" 
"Cost-effective system for the urban core" 
"A balance between two" 
 "Both, plus stay under budget" 
       
Question Eight: 
  Local government 64 31% 
Citizen groups 45 22% 
Private sector 51 25% 
Frequent riders 46 22% 
  206   
Question Nine: 
  KC Planners 20 23% 
Clay Chastain 6 7% 
Both 12 14% 
Neither 48 56% 
  86   
Question Ten: 
  Very seriously 12 14% 
Seriously 58 69% 
Not too seriously 14 17% 
Not at all seriously 0 0% 
  84   





 The original intent of this project was to study the effect of planning meetings and design 
charettes on the voting preferences of participants. A more in-depth survey than the one utilized 
above was designed for this purpose, and it was meant to be conducted both before and after a 
public meeting related to transit. The two-part strategy would have documented any immediate 
shift in opinion caused by what was presented and discussed at that particular meeting. The 
purpose of this would have been to measure the direct impact that city-employed planners, and 
the language and materials they used in communicating with the public, might have had on the 
political acceptability of a project then under construction, the Kansas City Streetcar. 
 This process was to have involved cooperation with city staff. I made arrangements with 
both city staff and the planning consultants hired to oversee the project’s public outreach efforts, 
and we communicated frequently at the start of this project. While both parties expressed an 
early eagerness to contribute to this project and to find ways to improve the city’s public 
participation strategies, complications soon arose. The Streetcar project staff requested that I 
rephrase the questions relating to past transit proposals to more explicitly imply that the city had 
always taken public participation as seriously as it did in 2014, a notion I knew from my research 
to be patently untrue. Later, city officials were shown a copy of the original survey, and they 
asked me to change the wording of Arnstein’s Ladder so as to not “give participants the idea that 
their government could ever be less than democratic,” or in other words, to remove the lower 
half of the Ladder from the survey. I objected to both of these requests on ethical grounds, and 
was told that without approval from the city government, I would not be permitted to conduct a 
survey during one of their public meetings. Consequently, the overall direction and research 
questions of this thesis had to be adjusted, and a new survey approach had to be undertaken. I 
found these attempts at censorship troubling but also informative, especially considering the 
original intent of this thesis was to examine the ways city planners can influence public opinion. 
I was thus able to experience proof positive that the relationship between planners and citizens in 
Kansas City is in need of a great deal more openness, honesty, and parity. 
 
Still, I conclude this project with some very useful findings, and with my integrity intact. 
         
         - James Wood, 2014 
